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CHAPTER I

INTRODUOTIOR
The purpose

or

this theais is to study the usages of virtus

in tbe writings ot saint Thomas Aquinas and to discover, if possible, a oentral meaning.
senses is an obvious taot.

That Aquinas uses virtue in manifold
For instance, b.e speaks ot intel16c-

tual and moral virtues, habitual dispositions ot mind and vill. l
Also 1\e refe);'s to both agent and possible intellect u
~ben

virtues. 2

be discusses tbe relationship between elements and the cam-

pound they torm, h.e maintains that the tormer are virtually present 1n the latter. 3 Oertainly the word virtus 1s not being used
in exactly the same manner tor all the above usagos.

Yet is

there a common thread whioh. links all these uses together? The
quest ot suoh a oommunit,. ot meaning 1s the goal ot tbis study.
The purpose ot the present endeavor will be Clarified by a
briet statement of what it is not.

It is not a study ot the moral

virtues in Saint T1\omas, 1t will devote SOMe attention to their
investigation, but the speoific nature of moral virtue 1s

--

13.'1'., I-II.... 51-58.
2
~.Q•• II, 11, N. 1581, ed. Mariett!
Jne Mut. !!!!., 5.
1

~orelgn

2

to the present intentions.

Nor will this paper examine the vir-

tues of active and passive potencies in any more detail than is
required to understand the general notion of virtue.

The core

meaning ot virtus throughout all its usages is the objective.
It might be objected that the scope or tne thesis is so
general that its value is minimal.
twotold.

Tn. value of this study is

First, the discovery ot a central meaning tor

virtu~

will cast abundant light on the particular usages ot the term.
and the importance ot the particular usages in tbe writings of
Saint Tbomas is undeniable.

Secondly, tnere 1s a general value

to be derived trom &Dr studY' of the writings of Aquinas.

An ex-

cellent way in which to oome to know the mind of tbe Angelic
Doctor is to study some specitic concept in his work.

In order

to grasp full,. the meaning of the particular notion, it is necessary to come to grips with the whole or at least a large portion

ot his philosopbical system,
This study sets as its objective an understanding ot virtus.
et tbe attainment of such an understanding must be by a cumulaive proce.s.

In the next Chapter, attention will be directed to

text otpI'imary importanoe in this study, the tirst article of'
be _
De .Virtutlbus
in .......
Communi.
..
·_
oiiooiioioI.............

Then a number of passages parallel

o the tocal text will be examined.
tudied in their histoI'ical order.

These passages will be
Perhaps some genesis ot the

sanins or virtu8 in the mind ot Saint Thomas will be observed.
Ithougb this study will not specifically investigate the his-

3
torical development.

After perusal ot tne central and parallel

texts, 1t will be obvious tbat numerous meanings have not been
treated.

For example, virtus Signifying angel is a trequent

usage ot the term D1 Saint Thomas. 4 These additional uses will
be discussed in a separate chapter.

In a tinal chapter, the

findings tram tbe body ot the thesis will be drawn together and
some special questions raised in the course ot development will
be subjected to sorutiny.
This study labora under a peculiar ditfioulty.
sense, a first ot its kind.

It is, in a

Various studies bave been made into

the meaning ot particular types ot virtue,> especially virtue in
the moral sense.

Ho studies, however, have sought a general mean-

ing tor all the usages ot virtus.

As a consequence, there can be

little recourse to secondal7 sources tor assistance.
The laok of dire4t commentary on the subject under examination oan be remedied in three ways.

First, Saint Thomas himself

can be summoned to explain what he meant in a oertain passage br
what he wrote elsewhere.

Seoondly, a tew ot the studies on par-

ticular types ot virtus will be useful.

4£.i.,

A number ot articles are

III, 80, n. 2.$56, ed. Marietti.

SVernon J. Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic
Metaphysics ot Potency and Aot," Essays in Thomism, Ed. Robert
E. Brennan, O.P. (New York: Sheea and Vira, l~J. PP. 101-10 &
370-73 J Luke J. Lindon, S.O. J., "Irhe Significance ot tbe Te:rm
\'lrtus Natural!s in the Moral Pb.ilosophy ot st. Thomas Aquina.s,"
Jroceedln,s ot: 'Ehe American Catholic Philosopil1cal Association,
5tXXI (19$ j,PP7"1'7-164: R.or! Renard, S.J., "ftie HaS!ts In 'E&e
System ot St. Thomas," Gregorianum, XXI~ (1948), Pl'. 88-111.

4
available on partioular passages whioh will be studied in detall. 6
Thirdly, a number of lexioons, in spite of the taot that they
only catalogue the many uses ot virtue and do not seek any general

meaning, will taoilitate this work.?
6Thomas Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologioa, Ed. Heinrioh
Maria Ohristman, O.p. (Salzburg: Anton 'Pustet, 1940), XI, PP •
.$.30-.32; Aquinas, Tb.eiJirtues, Tr. John Patriok aei4, O.P.
(Providenoe: ProVIaenoe 601l8ge Press, 1951), PP. ix-xxvii & 1-8,
M. Pierro_, "Un article de S. Thomas sur 1& vertu," Bulletin
Joseph totte, VI (19.35), pp. 406-14.
7R01 J. Deterrari, A Lat1n-~lish Diotionar.l of St. Thomas
Ag,uinas (Boaton: Daughters ot St"au1, 1(60), pp. E89-97,
neferrari & 81ster M. Inviolata Barry, O.D.P., A Lexioon ot Saint
Tbomas Agulnas {Vasbington: Catholic University of America Press,
1~48J, Pp. 1!59-67; Ludwig Sohutz, Thomas-Lexikon, 2nd ed. (New
York: Masurgia Publisbers, n.d.), pp. 8;2:&5: Pete".. ot Bergamo,
o. P., In ?Ber~ Saneti Tbomae Aguinat18 seu Tabula Aurea Eximii
DootorIi
0. . :
maltion8s Paullnae, n.~, pp. 994-16aS.

CHAPTER II

AN EXAMINATION OF THE OENTRAL TEXT:

-DE VIRTUTISUS -IN COMMUNI, 1

At the beginning ot this discussion, soma justif1cation
might be required tor beginning with the
article 1.

J2!. Virtutibus !!! Oommuni.

It is, as indicated by the chapter heading, the cen-

tral text in this disoussion ot virtus in tbe writings of Saint
Thomas Aquinas.

At first, the reader might be inclined to think

oation in itselt.
that the title,

De

-

Virtutibu8 in Oommuni, is sufficient justifiThe title could be interpreted as signifying

that this disputed question is an attempt on the part otAquinas
to collect into one treatise the manitold usages of virtus and to
explore what community exists among them.
Suoh, nowever, is not the case.
tutibul

!n .C.omm
___un
. i.

As will appear, the !!!. Vir-

is a discuss10n by Saint Thomas of the comma-

nit,. among not all tne usages ot virtua, but ot one partioular
type, virtus as hab! t¥.!.

Why then should this disputed question

be of interest to a discussion of the central notion of v1rtus?

In the first article of the question, Saint Thomas renders probably his clearest exposition or a central meaning tor the term.!it~

and gives his most extensive classification ot the various

types ot virtues.

Research on virtus in the writings of Saint

Thomas baa, therefore, revealed this article to be tlle most suit-

6

able point of referenoe in tne discussion.
In order to situate the reader in the context of the article
under consideration, it will be helpful to state in general now
the B! Virtutibus !n .e.o.Mm.-un
. i. develops.

Fatner Patrick Reid gives

tne following outline of the question. 1

Tbe first two articles

concern the nature of virtue.
of virtue.

Article. 3-7 explore the subjects

In articles 8-10, the anal,sis shitts to the erfi-

oient cause of virtue.

The tinal three articles, 11-13, treat of

tbe properties and distinction ot virtues.

As mentioned above,

the subjeot matter ot the question enoompasses the usages ot
virtus as babitus, such as the intellectual, moral, and theologioal virtues.

I t treats the central detini tion and tne princi-

pal usages of virtus only as preliminary to its studl ot the virtues wbicb are habits.
The subject ot the present chapter is tbe first article of
~

Virtutibus

!e

Oommuni or the first halt ot Aquinas's discussion

ot tbe nature ot virtue.

The following article is a commentary

on a detinition of virtue by St. Augustine.

It is not ot impor-

tance to this discussion.
Besides the general development, another point should be

-

- ----

The De Vlrtutibus in Oommuni is a late work ot Saint
.............
Its exact dates are not of oritioal importanoe in this
discussion, but it can be satel, placed among his writings between
IThamaa Aquinas, Saint, The Virtues, trans. John Patrick
Reid, O.F. (Providence: Provlaence dollege Press, 19>1), p. xxix.

1
1269 and 1212.2 It represents a work of the mature Thomas and,
along with the parallel passagea in the Summa, constitutes a much
clearer exposition ot virtus than can be found in the earlier
works.
Before

to~al

study ot the text, it will be helpful to ex-

plain the methodology here employed.

The general procedure will

be to present passages trom the first article of the
in
..........,

J2!

Virtutibus

Communi
. , and in a tow paragraphs to attempt an explication ot

the text.

In one instance, it will be necessary to interrupt the

general procedure to investigate the meaning ot an important detinition of virtus given bl Saint Thomas.

The guide, however, in

this investigation will be Saint Thomas himselt b1 means ot turVirtutibus in
Also in commenting on a classitioation of the vir-

th.er texts to whioh he refers the reader of the
Communi, 1.

De

tues given in the article, th.e work ot Vernon Bourke on tb.e same
subject will be ot assiatance. 3 At the olose of the chapter,
2 ft Critical authorities disagree to some extent as regards
the date ot composition ot th.ese five Questions on the virtues
/De Virtutibu8 in Communi, De Caritatej bi (!orrectione Fraterna,
15e~, and 15e lIrtutlbua O'ird{;X\;fi .-TEii, are, at beat,
unan mOU8 in-asslgning all t l v e o . fhamaata second sta, in
PariS, between the ,ears 1269-12. Srnave and Grabmann indicate
this three year period as the time of composition. Pere Mandonnet
narrows the span to the ,ears 1210-1212. Final1" Van Steenberghen and others would date tbese Questions some time after the
De Malo, which the, hold was written during the lears 1211-1212.
ra iri'"""content, tor pre.ent purposes, to acoept the date more
commonl, agreed on, 1269-1212, when st. Thomas taught at Paris
tor the second time." Ibid., p. xvi.

-

)aourke, pp. 101-109.

8
there will be a brief review ot tbe tentative conclusiona whicn
this article contributes to an understanding of ttle term virtue
in tne writings ot Saint Thomas plus some questiona which sbould
guide tne di.cu.sion in tne remaining chapters of tn1s tnesis.
Tbe title of tne R! Virtutibus
tutes Sint Habitus."

!! Co.-uni, 1 is -Utrum Vir-

It .bould be noted that virtutes in tnts

context reters to tne intellectual, moral, and tn-ologieal virIn tbe bodT ot the article, Saint Tbomas admit. tbat tnet-e

tues.

are valid usage. or tbe term vit-tus which. do not signify habit.,
Tet replies to the ot-iginal question ot tbe article in tbe aftirmative.

ae would be contradioting bias.lt unl•••• in posing the

question, be understood vit-tute. to reter only to tbe .intellectual, moral, and tbeological virtues.
Tbe boa, ot article 1, Wbieb i. tbe .ubjeot matter tor thi.
cbapter, i. divided into three parts.

The tirst section treats ot

the detinition. ot virtue, some nominal, and others essential.
In the second aeetion, virtues are classified according to tbe
various types of operative potencies.

Pinall"

in a concluding

section, a determination is made tbat virtu.s are nabit..

Tbe

general movement ot the pasaage is hom tne notion ot virtu. in
general to one partioular u.age.

8inoe the tirst two .eotions

oonoern tbe general notion ot virtu., they will be of primary
importanoe in tbe present chapter.
At tbe begiuning ot tbe corpus, Saint 'l'boll8.. explains the
noainal definition of virtus:

9

Virtus, secundum sui nominis rationem, potentiae complementum designat; unde at vis dieitur, secundum quod res aliqua
per potestatem eompletam quam habet, poteat sequi suum impetum vel motum. Virtue enim, secundum suum nomen, potestatis perfectione. demonstratJ unde rhilosophus dicit in 14
Caelf .!! Mundi, quod virtus est ultimum in re de potentia.
!!rtus has two nominal detirlitions.

Tne first is "potentiae com-

plementum" or "fulfillment ot a potency."

-

For this reason, it is

-

called a via since vis designates a power complete to the extent
that it enables its possessor to act ot its own initiative.

The

second nominal definition ot virtus i8 "potestatis perfection or
"actuation of a power."
tbat virtu. was

tn.

Aristotle referred to this when

he

said

"ultil'l'lWl 1n r. de potentia" or the tllimit ot

...

a th.ing's power" in the first book ot the -..;;,,;;;;;.;;..;;.
De aaelo. S

A thing 1s

limited in its activit,.. in so tar as the activation of the power
by which it acta is limited.

From the nominal definition, Saint Thomas proceeds to the
essential detinition ot the term:
Quia vero potentia ad actum dicitur, complementum potentiae
attenditur penes hoe quod completam operationem sueipit.
Quia vero operatio est tinis operantis, cum omnis res,
secundum Philosophum in I Caeli et Mundi, sit propter suam
operationem, siout propter IInem-Proilmum; unumquodque est
bonum, secundum qu.od habet oompletum ordinem ad suum tinem.
Inde est quod virtus bonum raoit nabentem, et opus .jus
reddit bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethio.; et per buno etiam
modum patet quod est dispositio perlecti ad optimum, ut
dicitur in VII Metaeh.6

4De

Vir. in Oom., 1 cJ the reference to Aristotle within the
quotation 18: R! dael., I, 11, 281a, lS.
Cael., I, 11, 2914, 15.
6De !!!. !e ~., 1 c; tne reterences to Aristotle within

50&

10

The struoture of the argumentation is as follows:

since poten-

eies are designated accoI'ding to their aets, the fulfillment of a
potency sif!."Uii'ies the oapability to undertake an operation in its
fullness; sinoe operation is the purpose of the operant and ever1'thing possesses its peouliar type ot operation as its proximate
end, a thing may be said to be good inasmuch as it is totally
ordered to that end; coupling these two notions, that a thing is
good in

80

far as it is ordered to its end and that virtue orders

a thing to its proximate end, Saint Thomas formulates two definitions of virtue:

(1) it is what "bonum facit habentem at opus

ejus roddit bonum" and (2) it is a "disposltio pertectt ad opti-

-.

_~_

...

ft

rhe

rlrst definition, "makes the possessor good and renders

its aotivity good," specifies the effects tnat virtue achiev.s in
its subject.
is.

frhe

~Go<Jnd

de>finition l:itatss directly what virtua

As a consequenoe, it will be of greater importance to this

study.
At this point, the essential definition of virtus as !y-sRositio Eer.t'ecti !& oRtimum must be examined in detail.

It will

proba.bly faoilitate understanding to examine the terms severally.
Three terms are significant:

d1spcsitio, perteoti, and o:etimum.

Although. a complete understanding of these terms is not 'to be
expected at this point, some grasp is neoessary for the subsequent

11

~

and that is

Within the scope ot Article 1 of De

development of' this thesis.

in 99Jf111?Jli , some explanation can be found,

the object of the present endeavor.
In the repl,. to tho ninth difficulty of Article 1, Saint

Thomas explains what he means by d1s2281t10:
D18positio dicitUl" trlbu8 t~d1!. Uno modo POl' quam materia
di8POnitur ad tormae reoep onem, slout calor est dispoal.
tio. ad formam ignis. Ati~ modo per quam. ali quod agens dis.
pon1 tur ad agendum, sicu ve too ! tas est diapos! tio ad cur...
sum. Tertio modo dispoaitl0 dicit-w:- ipsa ord1natio ali...
quorum a(l Iiiylcem, at hoe modo diapositio ab Augustino
sumitur. Dispos1tio vero contra bab1tum dividitur primo
modoJ ipsa v&ro virtua, diapositio est secundo modo."(
D1sposlt10 is used in the second· sense as "per quam agens dlspon1tur ad agendum."

V1rtus 1s a 4182os1t10 beoause it is that by

which a th1ngli.s;;1"'eadied tor activit,..

ot which a thing acta? It is a

tON.

Yet, what i8 that bY' means
Tb.ua tne d18P081tio is a

formal determination ot an agent in order tna.t it may aot.
What doea tlle perfeoti add

~o

the definition?

Sinoe tbe

phrase is diapositl0 pt!rtecti, the reasonable co.nclusio.n would be
that R!rtecti reters to tbe subject o.t the formal determination.
Pertect"!! ox-dinaril,. means that which. has act, and pertect\, here
designate. what has been actuated 07 the 41.p08itio.

ot tbe firat artiole ot De

V1rtutib~

!!!

O~it

In the bo.d1

Saint Tb.omaa

referred to. the fellowing passage from tbe seventn beok of bia

Ooaaentm S

7l2.t

the Pht.loa,a as the aouroe ot n1a definition of

.n.t. !!! ,ggm.,

1 ad

9.

8Tbe quotation above (p.

6), tram tbe eighth Marl9, cit.
Tnis readinSl! i8 olearly inoor-

ettl edition .. reada "VII MetaDn ..

12

virtus aEi disposltl0 perfecti

a~

optimum.

In that passage. Saint

Thomas explains more ampl1 tne meaning of perfect1:
Quia tunc est aliquld maxima secundum naturam, quando naturae virtutem nabet; virtu. enim naturae est signum oompletionis natUl'lae, cum aut em aliquld habet oomplete suam naturam, tune dicitur esse pertectum. Quod non solum in rebus naturalibus verum est, sed etiam in matbematicis, ut
sorum forma accipiatur pro eorum natura~ tune anim maxime
circulus est" idest pertectus oirculus, quando ms.ximi est
secunaum natur~" idest quando habet perfection•• suae--formae.
Sio el'lgo patet, quod cum ad perfeotionem formae, euju.slibet rei oonsequatur virtue ejus, quod tunc unumquodqua
perteotum est, quando babet suam virtutem. Et ita sequitur
quod virtue sit perfectio quaedam*9
Vir~~,

it 1s argued, is the sign ot a complete nature.

Whatever

-

has a complete nature is perfeot; Thus that whioh possesses vir-

.E:!!.

may be said to be perfeot.

Thus the term R!rfeoti in the def-

inition refers to a nature or power whioh is complete or, it might
be added, formally determined by a d182ositio.
optimum, the remaining term in the definition, remains to be
explained.

In the following passage, whioh. is taken from the com-

mentary on the

!!!

~ntsie~,

and to which he referred in

~

Virtutibus

Q..ommuni, 1 c. Saint Thomas indicates what the o;etimum in the

definition signifies:
Hujusmodi enim sunt qua.dam dispositiones ejus quod est pertectum in sua natura per oomparatione. !! o2timum, idest ad
reet. It should read "VII PhfS." In the seventh Marietti edi.
tion, the error was eorrected in a parenthesis immediatel,. tollowing the reference to the seventh book of the Metaehlsios. Reid,
in his translation of tne treatise on the vi:r£ues in general,
makes reference to the Phlsios.
9In VII Ph;z:s., 6, nn. 1860-61.

13
tinem« qui est operatio!

Siout enj~ dictum est, ex hoe hu.
jusmQai dispositionea v rtutea dicuntu~J quod bonum faciunt
b.9.bentem. at opus e jus bonum :reddunt. Dlcuntur e~go h.ujuamodi dispositiones pe~ relationem ad debitum opus, quod est
optimum rei.
.
Nee oportet exponare optimum, aliquld extrinseeum,
siout quod est pulcherrimum aut san1ss~, ut Commentator
exponit: accidlt enim pulcbritudini et sanitat1 relatl0
quae est ad extrinseeum optime dispositumte sed per se competit eis relatio quae est ad bonum opus. 0

The first part ot the passage 1s a review ot the ground already
oovered.

Virtutes are the dispositiones ot whatever is Eerteetum

in its nature by oomparison to the optimum which. is its natural
end or operation.
act.

Thus the op;1mum reters to operation or second

Optimum, as indicated in the tinal sentence ot the first

paragraph, is the debitum oRus which 1s the -greatest good- the
potency can acquire.

In tbe next

pa~aph,

Saint Thomas

1n~

structs his readers that oatimum does not reter to anything extrinsic to the potencl pos.essing virtue.

The oRt1mum doe. not

dssignate a measure ot goodness outside the subjeot.
nates

rathe~

It desig-

something intrinsio to the subject potencl, namely

the taot that the potenoT is formally determined to a speoific
operation.
In review, then, what does 41sRos1tio pertecti
mean?

!S oRt±!!!

The dispositio indicates what virtus directly signities,

viz., a tormal determination.

The 2erteoti represents the sub-

ject of this formal determination, an operative potencT.

The

oPtimum 1s second act or the aotlvitT to which the potencT by

l0lg VII PhIS., $, nne 1853-54.

means of' the formal determination attaint:.

!.4 oetimum

Dispositio l?erfectl

lT1S.7 be translated as "the formal determination of an

operative potency to ita proper activity."

Such is the central

definition of virtus according to Saint Thomas Aquinas.
In the second section ot the body of Article 1, Saint Thoma.
classities the different types of virtue.

This classification ls

ot importance to tnis stud7 alnee 1t reveals what usages ot

!!£-

understands as derived from the general meaning
-tus SainttermThomas
defined as dispositl0 perieeti !! optimum. 11
of the

The division of virtu! into its various types is, Saint Thomas states. "secundum autem dlve~sam conditionem potentiarum. u12
There are tb:r>ee t,-pes ot operative potencies:

totallY' active.

purely passiVe, and partiallY' aotive. partial17 passive.

Accord-

ing to these three types ot potencies, there are tbr.. types ot
.!.!.~tu••

The tirst t;rpe ot virtu. is that or tbe total17 active
potencies:
Potentia 19itur quae eet tantum a'In" non indiget, ad hoc
quod sit principlum actus. arlquo n ucto, unde virtue talis
potentiae nihil est aliud quam lpsa potentia. Talis autem
potentia est divtna, lntellectus agena. et potentlae naturales: unde harum potentiarum virtutes non aunt aliqui habitus. sed lpsa. potentiae in aeipsis complatae. l )
llot some assistance in the subsequent analyses of text will
be the work or Vernon Bourke on this subject.
12:oe

-

!!!:. !!! .2.2!.,
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15
In the active potencies, the virtus 1s "ipsa potentia in se ipsa
completa."

The potenc," itself is a virtue.

Of '.ts very nature

it 1s fomally determined to its proper aotlYity.
such

Examples ot

potencies are th.e divine power, ttl.a agent intellect, and the

natural potencies.
order to act.

None of these require

an

efficient causo in

or themselves they are tully determined to acnieve

their operation without etficient oausality on the part ot their
objects.,
A

11+
seoond type ot virtue can be found among tbe purely pas-

sive potencies:
111a8 vero potentiae sunt tantum aetas quae non agunt nisi
alii8 motae, nec est in ela agere vel non agers, sed secundum impetum virtutls moventi. agunt: .et tales sunt vires
sensitivae secundum se considerata.; unde in III Ethic.
dicitur, quod sensus nullius aotus est pr1ncip1um: at hae
potentiae perticiuntur ad suos actus per aliquid super1nduo tum; quod tamen non inest 8is sicut ali qua forma manena
in subjecto, sed solum per modna passionis, siout species
in pupilla. Unde nee harum potentiarum virtutes sunt habitus, sed magis ipsae potentiae, secundum quod 8unt actu
passa. a suis aetivis.15
The type ot potency here illustrated doos not act ot its own
power but only under the influence ot an etticient cause.

Exam-

~nHe begins by describing three ditferent kinds ot operative potencies. TOe tirst 1£1 wholly active in ita original state,
it requires, and oan have, nothing added to it to bring it to the
apex ot ita power. It ia a virtus beoause its potenoy ia metaphysioally complete within its species. Examples ot this type ot
wholly aotive potency are: the divine potenoy. the agent intellect, and physical torces. There can be no question ot tne development ot habitus in these potenele~, beoause they are metapn,sically perfect in their original eond1tions. ft Bourke, p. 104.

l$De Vir. in Com., 1 c, the reference to Aristotle within
the quotation 1s: pIc.
VI, 2, 1139&, 20.

m.,
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ples ot such. potencies are the sense powera.

The taculty of

sight, tor instance, does not operate except when stimulated to
do so by its proper object or etficient oause, color.
In suoh. potencies, what constitutes their virtus? Even
though senae powers are purely passive potencies, their aotivit,.
is immanent.

Thus alttlougb. they require anattioient oause to

aot, the aotivity must also be explained intrinsioall,..

The

intrinsic explanation ot sense aotivity is the virtus or tormal
determination to a speoifio aot of sensing.

This is what Saint

Thomas strives to point out when be sa,.s that the virtus of these
purely passive potencies i8 "ipsa potentia aotu passa a suis aotivia."

The virtus is "the potenol itself while aotually being

determined by the objects to act."
virtus:

This is the second type of

the formal determination of a purely passive potency to

its prasent operation. 16
The third type ot

virtu~

is desoribed b,. Saint Tbcmas in

the following passage:
Potentia. vero illae sunt agentes !!

acta~

quae ita moventur

...
l6 n A seoond kind of operative potencl is wholly passive. it
does not aot unless actuated by an active potenc1. This sort of
passive potenoy is perfected for the action proper to it b,. the
advent ot a quality Which is present onlr during the time ot
actual operation. This quality is called a passion and it does
not belong to the same apecies of quality aa habitus. Sinoe
these passions do not remain in the passive potency after tbe
actual operation has oeased, there ia no posslbil.ity of metapillsieal development in these wholly passive potencies. Tile sens.
powers (oonsidered simply in themselves without rational oontrol)
belong to this second type ot wholl.,. passive potency, in which. no
habitus formation is found." Bourke, P. 104.
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a suis activis, quod tamen per eas non dete~minantur ad
unum; sad in eis est agare, siout vires aliquo modo rationales; at hae potentiae camplentur ad agendum per aliquid
superinductum, quod non est in els per modum passionis tantum, sed per modum formae quiescentis, at manentis in sub.jecto, lta tamen quod per eas non de necessitate potentia
ad unum cogaturJ quia slc potentia non esset domina sui
actus. Harum potentiarum virtute. non sunt ipsae potentiae; neque passiones, sicut est in sensitivis potent!!s,
neque qualitstes de necessitate agente., sicut sunt qualitates rerum naturalium. sed sunt habitus, secundum quos
potest quis agere cum voluerit ut dicit Oommentator in III
de Anima. Et Augustinus in lib. de Bono OonJugali dicit,
quod 6i6itus est quo quis agit,
tempus alruerit. 11

cum

Potencies 01' the third type are the habituated potencies.
are partiallY' passive.

They

To act the,. require an efficient cause.

They are also partiall,. active.

The complete explanation

activity, bowevet-, is not tbe erticient cause alone.
the possible intellect can be a habituated potency.

01'

their

Fot- example,
To explain

an act ot knowledge, recourse must be had to ertioient oauses,
the agent intellect and a phantasm.

To explain tully, however,

human understanding, consideration must be given all 1ts factors,
among them the tamiliar pb.enomenon that new knowledge ill assimilated to the old.

This phenomenon sllows that the possible intel-

lect i. partial17 active in it. opet-ation, inasmuch as previousl7
acquired knowledge detet-m1.nes the reception ot the new.

To

explain why these powers assimilate the new acoording to the old

17ne Vit-. in Oom., 1 CJ the t-ererenoes to Averroes and

Augustlne-wYiEin~hj

quotation are the following: Avert-cas,
Commentu1um MaseUlD in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, ed. F. Stuat-t
Crawtot-d, {~orpus ~o;;entaI-Iorum lverrois In Xiistotelem, Vol. VI)
(Oambridge, Rass.: MedIeval Icadem,.
Imirica, tq;j), p. 438,
Ausustin, Saint, Oeuwes de Saint A!!s'ystin, Vol. I I : Prob1emes
Moraux, ed~_Gustave dom.Se;-(Pat-ls: ~sclee de Brouwet- et die,

or

IQU!'1)

n

au
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requires something intrinsic.

This something intrinsic which

determines the operations, is the third type of virtus.
The virtus ot the habituated potencies is the habit itselt.

It is a "forma manens in subjecto. It

Habits are tormal detel'mina-·

tions ot an operative potency which, along with the etticient
cause, determine the subsequent activity of the subject power. 18

---

At this point in the tirst article ot the De Virtutibus
in
- ......
Communi, Saint Thomas turns his attention to explaining in what
sense virtues are habits.

Since the article trom this point

onward (the question also) deals with some particular types ot
virtus, it is no longer ot interest to this general study.
In retrospect, what bas the analysis of' the B! Virtutibus
in Communi, article 1, revealed tor this study ot the general
notion ot virtue in the writings ot Saint Thomas Aquinas?

First,

it has revealed a central definition:

~

disRositio perfect!

18"1t is on11 when we come to the third kind ot operative
potency that the possibility, and need, ot habitus is found.
These last potencies are a sort of metaphysical .candal; they are
of a nature which seems to go beyond the limit. ot the simple
theory of potency and act. They are at once active and passive,
agentes et actae. It is true that they must be actuated bY' thetXt
corresponding active potencie., but this actuation does not, as
in the ease of wholl,. passive poteneies, determine t!:lam to one,
and only one, sort of operation. Even under the influenee of
active potene1. tbe.e powers retain, witbin well-defined limit.,
their ability to oontrol their own ope.ations. Wnat is produced
in these potenCies, under the aetuation of aetive potency, is not
met-ely a passion but a quality, of th.e nature ot a form, which
remains after the period of aetuation has ceased. The rational
powers of man are examples ot potenCies which can be tnus metaphysically developed, or brought to the condition of virtua, oy
the growth. of acquired qualities which are called habitus."
Bourtke, p. 104.
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optimum.

Virtus is "the formal detePmination ot an operative

potency to its proper activity."

The dispositio indicates what

virtue
.. direotly is, a formal determination.

Perf'ecti indicates

the subject of virtue, an operative potency which is perfected or
receives f'irst act by means of the 4.isposltl0.

The optimum indi-

oates the proper operation of the power, the second aot which the
~is:eositio

enables the operative patenc,. to perf'orm.

Secondly. the analysis has revealed a classification of'
types ot virtu. by Saint Thomas.

There are three types.

There

is the virtus ot the active potenoies such as the divine power,
agent intellect, and the natural potencies.

Tna virtus of such

potencies consists in the powers themselves which are fUlly determined to act.

The second type of' virtue is tound in the purely

passive potencies such as sense faoulties.

The virtue of' such

potencies is the potency itself when actually being determined by
its objeot to act.

The tinal type of virtus is found in the habi-

tuated potenoies such as will and intellect, acting under ttle
influence of' moral and intellectual habits.

The virtus of such

potenCies is the habit which, along with the efficient cause,
detep,mines the power to act.
There are likewise some questions that remain for development.

By questions for development is meant questions which

should guide the inquiry of' the remaining chapters of this thesis.
They are qu.estions raised during the examination of the

-

12! Virtu-

tibus in Communi, article 1, which should be answered if the

20

meaning of virtus in the writings of Saint Thomas is to be adequa,tely grasped.
R.egarding the central definition, two questions arise.
lirat, is it actually a central ddfinition?

Since it is round

in a treatise conoerning the theologioal, intellectual, and moral
virtues, 1s it perhaps a definition of virtus as habit rather
than of virtus in genaral?

Seoondly, it was presu.'11ed that virtua

and its definition can be restricted to operative potencies.
the further study of Saint

Thoma.e~s

In

writings, nowever, will it

appear that he uses the term virtus in oonnection with potenoies
which are not operatiVe?
There were three important terms in the oentral definition
of vir:tus:

d\seositio,

2erfeo",~,

optimum.

In the context of th.e

B! Virtutibus 1a. Communi, article 1, an attempt was made to
ola.rify' the meaning of those terms.

Subsequent inquiries should

focus on further clarifying their meaning.
Three usages or virtue were indicated in the article studied
the viI-tus of active potenCies, that of purely passive potencies,
and that or habituated potenoies.

-

-

Are there other usages of vir-

tus not mentioned in the central text and what are they?

Are the

usages mentioned here the most important and are there other
important usages to be disoovered?
A final question for development regards the context in

which the central definition and these three usages were vnoovered.

They were found in a oontext of a discussion of the virtue.

21

which are habits.

Does this indicate a certain primacy in the

mind ot Saint Thomas to be attributed to the moral and intelleotual virtues?

Does this indio ate that virtus as a habit is a

sort ot prime analogate and that all the other usages are secondary?

Such are the prinoipal questions raised by the study ot the

present chapter.
cate the answers.

It remains tor

tn.

subsequent chapters to indi-

CHAPTER III

A STUDY OF PARALLBL TEXTS
Tbi. ob.aptep wl11 conala' 1n a .tud7 ot tb.e papaUel text.
to

.2!.

Vlrtutibu!

!a OOJDNn!.

1.

Tb.el'8 are five pa.8age. tbat

tOrm talrl1 010.e parallels top the oentral text ot thi. disoussion. 1

The.e are,

the Iw.a Tbeolo&.\ae, I-II, SSt 1, the .eoond

book ot the O!,!!nt!£l on

tbe

Sentenoe., 27. 1, 11 tbe third book

ot the .8lI8 work, 23, 1, 3. sol. 1 and 3, tbe .eoond book of tbe

OOlll1l8nta£l

~Jl

!!!! Ethiq,•• leotU" S.

.

In tbi. obapter, the ~.l1el text. wl11 be exua1ne4 in
thelp chPonolo,lcal order.

The.R! Veri tate,

14. 3

and Sw.a

Theololl.. , I-II, 71, 1 vill also be .tuelied, eftn though tbe,.
are not euotlJ' parallel, s1Me

tant to

aD

the,. oontaln Uacus.iona apop-

uadepstand1na ot tbe .eneral notion ot vlrtue acoor4PI

1118 to Sain' Thomaa.
The _tho4 ..,l078d wl11 be the .ame aa lntbe prevloWi
chapter.

Paa.age. trOll tbe wrltings ot Aquina. will be 01'e4 and

explioated, alone vitb. comments on tbelr alga1tloance top tbe
pre.ent stuq.

The oonolucl1q p8.I'8gIIapba wl11 oonslder hoW the

quatioDS top 4evelopment posed in Ohapter Two have been
lAs 11sted in Sa1nt Thomas Aquinaa, SSa.,t10n.~ D&'eSt.!a••
8th ed. (Turint Harlettl, 1949), II, P. 7~7.
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olarified in tbe present chapter.

Likewi.e anJ further ques-

tiona raised bJ this chapter will be treated.
The firat thr•• parallel text8. wbicb

will be 8tudied as a

unit, aN trOll tbe Oommentul .2!! 19!. Sentenc...

Tbel constitute

Saint TbOJIas' S .&1'1188t expre8sion2 of b.1s ideas on tbe general
notion ot virtue.

The tirat text 18 found In Book II, Dist1notion

21, question 1, artlcle 1. Tbe general context of the article 1.
a trea-"nt ot grace.

The .pecltio question ot this artiole ls

"Utrua .1rhe alt babltu."

!be eolutl0 reada.
Oum .tteotua propo:rtionetur auae oa118u, oportet aotna po-

tentia. ratlonal18 Ip.! potentiae proportlOD&tua ••••• In
aute. virtutl. non aol_ oonslderatv sub.tantia Ipaiua
aotWl, sed etiam modus a8endi. non en1m qui casta operttur
q1100uaque m040 castu eat. sed qul faoiliter et deleotaol1itel" • • • • Deleotatl0 autem ex oonvenientla oausatur,
siout et in aenaibil1bua pate' quod oonJunc'io oonveni.ntis
cum conv.ntenti tacit de lee tatl on... Oport., ergo quod
actus virtutls p~.dat a potentia adaptata et assimilata
ad nunc actum. Hoc autem pot.ntia ratlonall. non habet ex
aeips., cua al' ad utrum11b.t. Oporte' er&o aliquid potentiae superaddl, ut perteotionem eJus, per quod talem actam
eduoa', undeo\Dlque cauaetv I et boc d101aus ea.. habi t_
virtutl. t at ideo 4101 t Pb.110.oplma • • • Cluod signum generati llabltua oporte' acaipere ti.nt. . in opere delectatlon.m. Hinc atlam .at quod potentia perf.cta per habitum virtnltis tentit 111 aotum oonalllil_ per m04wl oujua4ua natura. S
ps-opter quod dioit Tullius • • • quod virtua eat habitua,
modo natvae, ration! oonaentaneua, aieut en1m gravita.
deorsu,Dl tendlt, ita oas'itas outa operatur. Hine et1am
•• , quod in natura oample'a, euJua potentia ad malWl tl.cti
non poteat, non requiritv habitus quo mediante agat, quia
Ipsa potentia ex selpsa Pl'oport10Data •• , ad aetWl pert'"~~l

acn

arbe O~DtF. Oil tbe Senteno.. was vri tten between the
lear. 1253 an DS7 lS'l.-...rlLi lJralimarm, !homa.a AQuina., tnna.
Virgil Michel,O.S.a. (Ie. York:· Lonpana, Gr••n
1928),
p. 21.

no.,

tum ut in Deo patet.)
The tirst assertion of this passage is that, Just as every effect
is proportioned to Its cause, so every act of a rational potency
must be p:roportioned to the power.

In an aot ot virtue (bare a

rational act), however, two faotors MUst be considered, tne sub.
stance ot the act and. the manner in Whioh it is plaoed.

For

example. the virtue ot chastity does not consiat merely in the
positing ot a chaste act (substance), but in the fact that it is
placed with facility and delight (manner).

Therefore, acts ot

human virtue cannot be explained. exclusive11 in terms of the
rational power, but require an additional explanation, a habit.
Thus tu the discu.sion has been confined to a particular t7Pe ot
virtua, human virtue.
I

In tbe tinal sentences ot the aolution, however, Saint
Thomas points out a parallel between tbe human and "naturalft virtues.

An

habituated rational power tends towarda an act Which is

quasi-natural to it.

POI'

example, wl11 ot ita nature is not dls-

posed to any specific type ot act.

Tbe habituated wl11, however,

is inclined to specific aots which may be said to b. quasi-natural to it.
ver7 nature.

Natural potenci.s tend tow-.rds specific acts of their
Since, by nature, they are determined to these acts,

they do not require • habit in order to be virtues.
I.

The reply to
...

lIn II Sent •• 27, 1, 1 sol., the references to Aristotle
witb.1n the quot.£ion are the followins: Nie. Etb.., I, 8, 1099a,
"
17-21, Ibid., II, ), 1104b, 4; the refereno; to'11ic8ro ia: Cicero,
~_ Inveii'iIOne, II, ,~f" 159, e4. H.M. Hubbell (Oambridge, Mas". I'
tlal'var! tr. Press. 1'ttl.9). J:). 327.

2,$

the second difficulty reiterates tbe ooncluding assertion 01" tbe

solutio:

"Potentiae naturales sunt deter:minatae ad suoaaotus ex.

.aips!., unde non indigent babltu determinant•• siout potentiae
rationales. quae ad utrumlibet sunt.ttl&. The tenor ot these remarks
is that a virtue 1s wbat determines an operative potency to speoific types of operation.
In tbe repl,. to the third difficulty, an important idea ia
added:
Quidam dlount quod virtutes habent quosdam aotus qui oontlnui sunt, neoin eis eat interpolatio, quamvla a nobis
non sentiaturt non enb virtutes posse oti08as esse aestimant, Sed aotua eat duplex: scilicet primus" ut e ••e est
actus formae, et tali. aotu. virtutls continuua eat,
man.nt• •nim caatitat. continu., manet •••• castum, et
aotu••ecundus, qui .at operatio, et nunc non contingit
oon'binuWll e.8e J hic en1m ~ non tatum eat virtutla, aed
potentiae quam perticitJ si!ut nulla forma quae non eat per
ae aubsistens babet operatione. praeter oommunicationam
subjecti, neo oontlngit aotum alique. e ••• vel operation..
ex libero arbltrio, et praecipue cum electione, sine qua
viMutis aotus esae non potest, qua a nobis percipiatur.S
The

difticult7 stems .trom an asseMion that aot. ot virtue are

oontinuous.
virtue

fA"

Saint Tbomas replies witb a distinotion:

aots ot

continuous it oonsidered formall1. tnat is, while the

virtue, e.g., obastit1, remains present, the aubjeot is virtuous,
e.g., obaste, continually.

It, however, acts df virtue are con-

aidered as operations, they are disoontinuous.

~hus

virtues are

considered as abiding dispositions ot·the potencies tbe7 lntOl'm,
4Ibid., 1, ad. 2.

-

Slbld., 1, ad 3.
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and virtuous aots are oonsidered as prooeeding trom botn the virtue and the pot.noT.
Th.e other parallels in the Oommentarl .2!l

!W!. Sentenoes are

found in Book III, Distinotion 23, question 1, artiole 3.

The

first subordinate quer7 01" artiole three takes up the problem
"Videtur quod virtute. non sint habitus sed potentiae."

In the

solutio, the tollowing &nswer i. given.
Nomen virtuti., seoundum 8ui primam imposit10nem videtur 1n
quamdam violentiam sonare. Unde in III Caeli et ~~di • • •
dioitur quod motus accidentali8, idest vloientua, e.£ qui
est a virtute, id.st a violentia, non oum auxilio naturae.
. Sed quia non potest aliquld alteri vl01entlam tnferre
nial per potentiam pertectam, seoundum quam agat et non
patiatur, lnde traotwa e8t nomen virtutia ad slgnitioandum
omnem potentiam per1"eotam, aive qua poteat allquid ill.sip.o
snb.istere, sive qua potest operari. Et sio dicitur 1n I
O.eliet Mundi, quod virtua est ult1mum potentiae, quia perleotiopo£.ntiae mensuratur ex ultimo et maximo quod quia
poteat.
Et quia malum in actu oontingit ex 4e1"eotu potentiae,
exigitur quod bene operetur in genere suo. :it propter hoc
4icitur in II !!h., ••• quod virtua e.t quae bonum tacit
babentem at opus ejus bonum redditJ. et in VI KhZS., •••
dioitur quod virtu. eat 41spositio perfeoti a optimum,
eorum soilloet ad quae potentia se extendit.
Et quia de virtutibus human1s 10quimurJ ideo virtus
humane. erit6Quae particiet numanam potentia. ad actum bonum
et optimum.
Thi. passage

ma,. be conveniently elivided into tour parts

accord-

ing to tb.e separate paragraphs.
In tbe tirst paragraph, a nominal definition of virtus, no
doubt based on 8. supposed etymologioal connection with!!!. is
6In III Sent., 23, 1, 3, 801. 1, tbe references to Aris.
totle wrihin tne-Quotation are the following: De Oael., III, i,
301h, 18, Ibid., I, 11, 2818., 7ft., Ni<H Eth •• tr,-;;-1106a, 1516, .f!g!,•• nt, 3, 246b, 23.
-
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given as violent!a.

Virtue and violence have this in cammont

they both produce ohange in the object acted upon without any
help trom the object so acted upon.

Aristotle recognized this

similarity between virtue and violence in his treatise on the
heavens and the earth..
In the second paragraph, Saint Th.omas penetrates further
into the likeness between virtue and violence.
be activelr inflicted by a perfected pote:pc1'.

Violence can only
Such a potency can

be perfected in two ways, in the order ot SUbsistence or in tha
order ot operation.

Accordingly the virtue. are divided into

those which perfect potencies to entitative act and those which
pertect potencies to operation.

A new categorJ of virtue is

introduced. the virtus ot potency to being.

This type of virtue

Vlrtutlbu8 in Oommuni. article 1,7 wbere virtus was restricted
to operative potencies.
lies outside the scope ot the classification ottered in the De

In the following paragraph, two essential definitions are
derived.

Because any detect in operation results tram an inade-

quacy in the power, there is required something over and above the
operative potency tor it to act.
enables it to perform second acts.

Virtue perfects the potency and
Thus virtue can be essential17

defined alternately as "tnat whicn renders a subject good and its
operation good" or "tne disposition of a perfected power tor what
J

"n
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is best in it."

Th.ese two definitions are already familiar a.nd.

have been explained elsewhere. 8
In this same paragraph, Saint Thomas offers a different
reason for the use of th.e word optimum.

Virtue is opposed to

deteot, likewise the effects of each are opposed.

A

defect in an

operative potencY' results in an evil, oonsequently, virtue must
result '.n a good.

The good in this case is an operative act

tully in aooord with the finality of the potency.

The use ot the

superlative o;etimum i8 explained by the fact that the perteetion

ot an operative potency is designated acoording to the maximum ot
which it is capable.
The first three paragraphs parallel the introduotory seo-

tions of the corpus of the R! Vlrtutibus
~rhe

is

Communi, article 1.

argumentation begins with a nominal definition ot !,irtu8 and

then prooeeds to an essential definition of the term.
central text, the definitions cited

ot

8.S

As in the

essential are from Book II

the Ethics and trom Book VI of the Physics.

In the tinal paragraph, however, Saint Thomas clearly indioates that he is making a transition from the notion of virtue in
general to that ot human virtue.

Ue gives a definition of b.uman

virtu., "Quae pertieiet humanam potentiam ad aetum bonum et optimum."
~

Thi8 definition is an application ot 418208itio Rertecti

o2timum to a more particular realm and probably indicates a

8Cf. above PP. 8-13.
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certain preferenoe on his part for the definition from the
Phlsics.

In his reply to the first difficulty, Saint Thomas adds a
note whioh will aid an understanding of virtue as disposing to
entltatlve act:
Potentia naturalis qua quis potest esse, est determinata ad
unum, scilicet ad esse, ideo ipeius perfeetio secundum
insam naturam potentiae esse potest, et ideo ipsa potentia
virtus dicitur.9
The natural potency which disposes something to existence 1s a
determination to one thing, viz.,!!!!.

Sinoe this disposition

or perfection of ita very nature belong. to the potency. the
poteney can be called. a virtue.

Thus potency to being 1s similar

to the natural powers in being a virtue.

In the reply to the third difficulty, a distinction between
~irtue and

!.!!.

is given:

"Vis aocipitur pro omni eo quod est

prinoipium operationis at non solum operationi. perfeotae, quod
importat nomen virtutis."lO

Thus!!! is a wider term than virtua,

Vis signifies any prinCiple ot operation, while virtu. is oonfined to prinoiples ot perfect operainolusive of the latter.

tion.,
The next parallel text i. the third subordinate quer7 of

the same article.

It is conoerned with the problem, ·Videtur

quod virtute. non sint habitus •• d actus."

.
91~ III ~., 23. 1,

-

lDtbi4., 1 a.d J.

J, sol. 1 ad 1.

The solutio reads:

--

30

V1rtua proprie loquendo includlt reepectum adaliquid cujus
principium sit, siout ourrendi vel essendi. Et quia aotus,
inquantum hujusmodi, cum sit ulttmum, non ordinatur ad aliquid siout principium sed magis siout a1iouju8 ettectus,
1deo actus virtue dicl non Eotest ,ia1 eo modo l~uendi ~
ba~itw! .2!.£ !ciu! iiOitniiiiur~ alcu oauiie--p;r e eeius.-nThe principal sens. ot this passage is tbat virtues are not'acts.
Virtue tnoludes a relationship to tbat tor whioh it is a principle
Aot, however, sinoe it is tinal, can be ordered to anottler as an
etfect but never as a prinoiple.

Theretore, virtue. are not act.

except in the 8enae tnat principles are sometimes described in
terma ot tbeir results.
In suaar,.. then, what doea tbe Cotqmentau S!! tbe Sentenoe.
reveal about the mind ot Saint thomas on virtue' Firat, tbe
det1nitlon, d1s208itio e!rrecti

!! opt1!Q!. ie exp1icit1,. stated

in Book III. Distinction 23 and implicitl1 contained in the di8-

eU88ion ot Book II, Distinction 27.

It seemarea80nable to assume

at this point tbat it is the essential detinition ot the term.
Second1,., in Di.tlnctlon 23 a clear distinction 1a drawn between
virtue 1n general and buman Virtue, and dls20s1tio p!rteoti
o~t1mum

~

was given .s tbe det1n1tion ot virtue in general.

Thirdl." only the natural potenoie. and habit. are used as e:umplea ot virtue J a taot which.

~·l'a1s.s

a question how important in

Aquinas-s mind the 8econd category ot tbe cl.ssitic.tion tntbe
central text i..
virtus.

Pinall"

~iolentia

was given aa a .ynoD1M tor
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The next parallel is the fifth lecture of Book II of the
Con:..men~,i!.r.z

2!1

!h.2.

Ethics.

Am.ong the parallel texts, it consti.

tutes a middle point in Aquinasts asvalopment. l2

It is not very

nelpful to the present study ot virtuA in general.
Saint Thomas gives the framework ot his discussion in the
fifth lecture with the followlng words:
Ad p~~rscrutandum quid est virtus, oportet assumere, quod
tria aunt in anima, scilioet passiones, potentiae at habitus. Quorum alterum neeses. est esse t"irtutem. Dixit anim
ffiristoteleg supra quod virtus est principium quarumda.m
opera.tionum animae. lUhil autem est in anima, quod sit
operationis prineipium, niai al1.c:uod hol"1ll11 trium. 13
Aristotle considers three aspects of the soul:
powers, and the habits.

the pa.ssions, the

One category must be identical -vnth the

virtues; tor virtues are pX'inciples of opera.tion, and these three

constitute the only

p~inciples

of operation in the soul.

The virtues are not passions:
Secundum virtutea dicimur boni, at secundum malitias oppoai.
tas dicimur mali. Sed secundum passiones absolute conaideratas non dicimur boni vel mali. Ergo passiones neque sunt
12Aecording to Grabmann the CO~4ntarJ on the Ethics was
written between the years 1261 and 1 .• 6 .~tIn G~abmann,
Thomas Ag,uinaa, trans. Vi~gll r,!1chel. O.S.B. (New Yo~k: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1928). P. 19. Variant opinions ares tbat
the commentari on the Ethics WftS w.ri tten about 1260--Cf. Gerard
Verbelie, "ta
~oommentair. sur llethique,U Revue Phi1oso'li4
phiQue de Louvain {19t~9 ),XLVI I. p. 220; tha. t it was wr! t ten .
arter tlii lSrIiii Pars--ot. A. Mansion, "La date du Oomm.entairede
S. Thomas sur l'1iEIque," Revue Philosophi~ue de Louvain (19$2),
L, P. ~71J that it was written ~urlng the 1ea.rs-X21b-l~11-.Cf.
A. Gauthier. O.P •• "La date du conunentaire sur ItEthique,"
Recherches ~ ~heoloii& Anoienne !! Medievale (19$1), XVIII, PP.
1101+-5.

are

-

13In

II

-

Eth., 5. n. 290.
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virtutes neque malitiae.14
Nor are they potencies:
Nullu. bonus vel malus dicitur, neque laudatur neque vltu.
peratur ex hoo, quod potest pati. seoundum aliquam passionem,
pu'a ex hoc quod potest lra801 vel timers. Sed secundum
virtutes et malitlas dicimur bonl vel mall, et laudamur vel
vl'up.~.~.
Ergo virtut•• et malitia. non sunt poten.
'l&e. l ;.1
Tb.ay are

habi ta J

Ooncludit propoaitum: quia soilicet si virtute. non aunt
passiones neque potentia., relinquitur quod sunt habitus
.eoundum dlvisionem pra.mias... 16
Tile

general arsument i. thi.:

aooording to "ir'bue and vice, men

are praised or blamed, inasmuch. as men bave passiona and express

them, tbel are not praised or blamed, b7 a process ot elimination,

hab1ts are tbe on17 principles ot operation with.in tbe BOul which.
can

be virtues.

Since this art1cle is confined to buman virtue,

it i. not ot speoial significance for the present ••udJ'.
The

final parallel text to be discussed bere 1s the til'S'

article of tbe fifty-fifth question in the SU!!!,

~rtma-S.oun.

dae. 11 Directly tbe question concerns human virtue.

Since, hov-

ever, it approaches its subject througb the more general notion of
virtua, it is significant for the present stud;r.
noted tbat tbe writing ot the present
~!2j!., n. 299.

lSIbid., n. 303.
i6Ibid.. n. lOS.

11!_!_, I-II, SS, 1 o.

~ext

It should be

1. clos•• t in time to
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the oomposition of ~ Vi£~utlbua !e Co.mmunl. 18 A more mature
viewpoint i. evidenced by tbe olear argumentation ot the. article.
The 62rRus ot the Summa

~heolosiae,

1 ..11,

SS,

1 reads t

Virtua ncm1nat quandam pot.ntiaa perfeotione.. Uniuscujuaque autem pertectio praeoipue oonsideratur in ordine ad
'
suum. rine.. Pini. aute. potentiae aotus est. Uncle potentia dicitur e ••e pertecta, .eoundum quod determ1natur ad
suum ..tum.
Sunt aute. quaedam potentiae quae secundum .eipsa.
aunt determ1Datae ad .uos aotua, siout potentiae natural••
act! vae. Et ideo h.ujuamodl potentia8 naturale a .ecundum
a.ipsa. dlcuntus- virtut••• -.Potentlae auhm rationale ••
quae lunt propriae nomini., non aunt determinatae ad unum,
•• d .e habent iad.terminata. ad multa: deteN1nantUl' aut.1t
ad actus per habitu., siout ex aupradictia patet. Et ideo
Yr1;tiWie • tmItM. blb1tua !!Ii.19
A. in the tiPs, artiole ot the

1!!.

ViPtutibu

.!!l

O~.

Thoma. begins with a nominal detinition ot virtue.
nat • • • potentia. pertectionem."

Saint

"Virtu nomi-

Virtu. i8 the perfection ot a

potenc,...
Prom 'his notion, he aJ'gue. to an e8.ential detini tion ot
the tel'll.
1it7_

Bve17 p8pteotion 1s unc1er.tooc1 according to it. fina-

The tinalit7 ot pot.n07 i. act.

Th.us, to sa7 tbat a pot-

enol" 1. perteet i8 to as.eM tbat it i. determined to act.

The

not10n ot viJ'tue aa a deteNinatlon ot a potane,. 11;0 ita aot 18
18Mandonnet t s opinion was that the Prima-Secunc.iae waa wr1 tten between the ,.ear. 1269 and 1270 J GrablUl'm milnt.med 1 twa.
oampleted by Maroh, 1266. Cf. Vernon J. Bourke, Tnomlatio Bib11ograJ&11920-1249 (St. Louis: The Modern SonooJ.ma.n, rqq:$J, p. 13.
(lloneuTs opIiiIon ia identical with tnat of Mandonnet. ct. p.
G1orieux, "POUl' 1& chronologie de la SOlIIIe," MellYea ~ 801enoe
Ra11s1euae, (194.$), II, P. 94.
,,' \ c:,
-:-'''' ..
'¥~,

191_1_, I-II,

SS,

1 o.

f

\ __

.F

...../

:-,A~.>

:_.

"

;.Ci v~ L"',

c ",! J '\,' ;::._':.:; 'T--,

\.).
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equivalent to the all'ead7 studiett20 essential detinition ot virtus
as

<!~s20sitio

perfect!

.!i!

optimum.

In the, second pa.ragra.ph. a
alternativo to that ot the
1'wo types are mentioned.

~

Virtutibus

Example. ot tbe.e powers according

,be S\Ur1I1a are the natural powers.

an,. specitio act.

.!!! Oommuni. 1, is given.

Theae are tbe "potentia. tantum

aotivae" ot tbe central text.

in'a tbe s.oond cateso:roy.

of virtues,

The first type is the powers determined.

to act 01' their vePf nature.

to

cl:i~sil'ication

The rational powers fall

S1 nature, th..,. are not determined to

To be determined to a special operation, tD.e,.

require determination br babits.

The seoond O&togo17 of virtue

hepe comes th.1rd in the olasaifioation of the central text.
Tb.e difterenoe in olassitication results trom & ditterenoe
in principle.

In the

R!.

Vlrtutibus

!n 09!Pun1

the prinoiple 01'

olassification il tb. aotivity or pasaivity ot the powers.
a principle yields three oategories ot virtue.
tOl'J' ppinciple

ot

Suoh

The olassitioa-

ot ttle Prima-Seoundae, SSt 1 i. tbe determination

tbe powers to ODe or more tban one aot bY' nature.

It is hard.lJ'

aurprising tbat such a prinoiple 71e1ds only two categories.
c1as.ifioation ot th.

J)e
.......

The

---

Vll'tutibus in OOlllllUDi oompreband. all
.,

categories ot tbe classitioation in the Summa• plus an additional
In his rep11 to the tirst difficultY'. Saint thomas state.:

Quandoque virtu. dioitur id ad quod 8at virtua, soilioet
vel obJeotum virtuti., vel aetua ejus, sieut tIdes dieitur
quandoque id quod ereditur, quandoque vero ipaum er.der.,
quandoqu. aut.m ips. habitus quo ereditur. Unde quando
dicitur quod virtue eat ultimum pot.ntiae, aumitur virtu.
pro objeeto virtut!s. 1d en1m in quod ultimo potentia
pot.st, est id ad quod dieitur v1~tU8 rei: .ieut si aliquis pote.t terre centum libra. at non plus, virtue ejus
conaideratur secundum oentum l1br&D, non autem secundum
saxaginta. Objectio aute. proeedebat ac 8i e •• entialiter
virtus e ••• t ultimum potentiae.21
In answering the diffioulty, Saint Thomas points out that
is sometime. used tor the object or tbe act 01' virtue.

vir~~

Por exam-

ple, taith .ometimes reters to what i8 believed, at other time.
to the act 01' belier, and sometime. to the babit by which "e
believe.

Only the t1nal usage properly conveys the notion of

tai th a8 a virtue.

Tn. ditticult)" propo.ed is adjudged inValid

aince it pooeed8 as it ttle teN 'rirtu. were being used properl,.
onl1 when it is applied to the object 01' a virtuous act.
Thia passage i8 important tor the tollowina reaaon.

Saint

Tbomas bere reoognize. two Wlage. 01' virtu. (as reterring to the
operative act and to ita objeot) which do not retlect tbe ••••ntial meaning 01' tbe term.

Thu. it will not b••urpri.ing to tind

-

usages in his writings not contoNable with the definition, di.2o.1tio i!rtecti

~ opt~.

R.lat1 v. to thi. pa•• age, two 1 tems should be noted about
the article which immediately follows it d•• pite the fact that
the subsequent article is not a parall.l text.

The first item i.
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in tbe third difficulty wMcn bagina I

"PnetGPea, Pb.ilo8opbus

dicit • • • quod virtue eat dlspo.ltio pertecti ad opttmum."22
In the iU.tfloultl. Aqulnaa mentions the essential c:lennltion onlJ'

indlrectlr and attribute. it to Aristotle. In bia reply to the
difficulty. nowaver. b.e do.. not qu.etten
de rint tlon but on11 tbe

tn. valld1t1 of

the

acouracl of 1ta in.terpHtatlon bl tbe

supposed 01>joctor. 23
The ripst paragraph. of the 02£2ul 1a also wol"th.7 of atten-·

tlon:
tb

1

, •
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Virtus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, importat quandam pertectione. pot.ntiae • • • • Unde, cum duplex 81 t potentia,
8cillcet potentia ad .sse et potentia ad agere, utriuaqua
potentiae p.rtectio virtu. vooatur. S.d potentia ad e8 ••
• e t.net ex parte matenae, quae eat ens in potentia, potentia auta a4 agere .e tenet ex. parte tormae, quae e.t principi~ agendi, eo quod unumquodque agit inquantum eat
actu.ZI$.
The bod,.

ot tM. article, like the abea41 examined passages,

beg1na with a nominal detinition ot y1rtua, -tbe pertection ot a
potenol.- !ben lt is asserted tbat tbere are two t1P88 ot potenc1, poteno,. to being and PO"n07 to operation.
eaoh ls a virtue.

fbe pertection ot

'.fMa olassitioatlon ot tne potenole. anA their

viptuea is ditterent trOll tbe two olassitications al.ftaq en-

BetON

tbe exam1Dation ot torthep text., it will be p!'otlt-

able to ..._anze wba.t tbe parall.el tIt_ tbe Ps:W-SeOUD9! baa
oontribut.d to tb1a8tl1q. . POUI' oonoluiou

aPe

plal1td.ble.

definltion hoa the o.ntpal. Mxt, di8lositit? artloti

Tbe

.!!! oRt1muta,

alth.ougb. atated only obliql1e17, appears to be an .asential definitlon .iaoe tbe diacuesion ot tbe ••••ntial meaning ot virtue in
the oODus ot Q,uestion SS, Article 1 18 equivalent to it.
alternate olae.itioationa

~t

i'vo

virtue, one according to the numb••

ot act. t01l8.l'48 wbich tbe subject potenol' is b,. natUl"e order.4,
tbe s.cond acoorting to tbe act,

tu.t or .econcl, towards vb.1ob

the potenoy i. opdeped, aN tound, both ot wbicb. are 1••21 oamp"bensS. ve than the three oategorie. ot tbe central. text.
~.!., I-II, SSt 2 o.

The

.80-
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ond olassifioation, however, introduces a type ot virtue, the disposition ot potenc1 tor being, which raises the questionwhsther
the term vlrtus can be restricted to operative potencies.
Finally, it should be noted that two 8.dd1tlonal non-essential
meaninp~

are enoountered--virtue as aot and as object; yet it

should be remembered that both. are ippl'"Dper uses ot the tel'm.
All the directly parallel text. of
have now been examined.

~

Virtutibus

!n

O~

There remain, however, two add! tional

texts that are important to this stud7.
Veritate, Que8tion.~, Article 3. 2$

The

question posed at the

The

first is the De

beginning of this article is "Utrum tides sit virtus."

Saint

Tbomas answers thus:
Virtus ex impositione sui nominis signiticat complemen1nlll
act1vae potentiae. Activa autem potentia duplex est: quaedam quidem cujus aotio terminatur ad al1quid aotum extra,
sieut in aeditioatione aotio ter.minatur ad aeditioatum,
quaedam vero est oujus actio non ter.minatur ad extra sed
consistit in ipso agente ut visio in vidente • • • •
In his aUtem duabu8 potent!1. d1versimode sumitur
complementum.
Q.u1dam en1m actus pIlimarum potentlarum • • • non
sunt in tac1ente, sed in tacto: ideo complementum poten.
t!ae acoipitur 1b1 penes Id quod tit. Unde at virtue dete~
entis pondera dicitur esse in hoc quod maximum pondus detert
• • • ; et similite~ virtue aediticatoris in hoc quod taoit
domwn optimam.
Sed quia alterius potentiae actus conslstit in agente,
non in ali quo actu, ideo oomplementum illius potentiae
aocipitur seoundum modum agendi, ut scilicet debite et oonvenienter operetur, ex quo habet ejus actus ut bonus dies..
p

p

25The Di8~ted Questions on Truth were written between th.e
year's 1256 and -59. <It. Vernon J. aourke, 1n Saint Thomas Aquinas, Truth., trans. Robert W. Mulligan, 8.J., James V. MCGl1nn,
a.J. t Ro~ert W. Sohmidt, 8.J. (Ohicago: Henrl RegnePJ Co.,
19521, Introduotion, I, P. xvii.
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tur.

Et lnde est quod ln huJumodl patent1is yj.rtus dicl-

tur quae opus bonum reddlt. 26
Tb.e passage begins with

It.

nominal definition ot virtue, fttb.e tul-

tl1ment ot an active potency."
ings.

Act!ve potancy can havo two mean-

1"I1"8t, tbeN 18 tbe t1" or active potency vh1ch terminates

in something extrinsio to tbe agent, a.g., that of buIlding, which.

terminates In the tninS buIlt.

Seoondly, there Is the type whose

actlon 1s imm.a.nent, e.g., that or .eeing, wtlose action 1s total11
contained 1n the s.er.
Aa

the active potencle. differ, 80 the f'ultllment dl.fte:p...

In tbe oaa8 of a transient aotion, the tu1f'llment must be mee.8UJted
according to tM effect ppoducect.

ing 1. a good bouse.

In tbe

C&88

'I'bua the non twBouaebul14.

or

immanent action, the fulfil-

ment must be measured in terms of the operation witb.ln the agent.

ot .eeing 18 good sight.

'rbus the no""

The signIficance ot this text 18

twotold.

a thlrdolaaalt1catlon of virtu. aooaNing to

Firat, it offe.,..

POW".

Viptu••

are distinguished acoordlng to their potencie8--tor transient or

im.manent aota.

Seoondl7, tMs classifioation or virtues accol"'4-

ing to tran.lent powers poaes a
....

8191'11011.

41tfl.oult7_

On tbe basi.

'

ot this claeaitioation, 1t migbt b9 argued that the Oati!!! of
the essential detinl tion, oan Ntel' to .omething eztl'in8io :rathep
tban intrinsio.
F

1

If thi. 1.
n

80,

it

co~110ta

vito numerous Thea..

40
1stio texts already oited.

However .. it does not seem that Saint

Tbomas meant the optimum to refer to something extrinsio since he
points out in his reply to the third difficulty.
Bonum illud ad quod virtus ordinatur .. non est aooipiendum
quasi aliquod objectum alloujus aotus) sed 111uo. bonum est
ipse aotus pertectus, quem virtus e1101t. 27
<

Is there, tnen, a oontl'a.diotion of the coreus in the reply to tbe
tbird diffioulty? A oloser examination of ttle body of tbe artiole reveals tbat Saint Tbcmas speaks only of the "virtus deferentis pondera" and "virtu. aedifloatoris," i.e., of the subjeot
which operates.

In the reply to th.ediffioulty, be affirms that

virtue belongs to the operator and not to the effeot.
The

tlnal text to be examined is in the Summa Theo10siaeJ

it is tbe oorpus of Artio1e 1 01' Question 71 01' the Prima-Seog-

-

dae.

The artiole at issue deal. with the question "Utrum Vitiu.m

Contrarietv Virtuti?"

Saint 1'11011.as answers a. tollows:

Clra virtutem duo possumus considerue: scilicet ipsam
essentiam. virtutl.J et id ad quod est virtus. In easentia
quidem virtutls aliquid oonsiderari potest directe, et allquid ex conaequenti. Directe quldem virtus importat dispositionem quandamalicujus convenlenter ae babentis secundum modum suae naturae, unde Ph110sophus dicit • • • quod
v!rtua est 41spos1tio pertect1 ad optimum, dloo aute. perteot!, quod est dispositum seoundum nature. FiX. consequent1
autem sequitur quod virtus sit bonitas quaedam: ln hoo
enim oons1st1t uniusoujusque rei bonitas. quod oonvenlenter
se habeat seoundum modum suae natune. Id autem ad quod
virtus ordinatur. est aotus bonus. 2ti
27Ibld., 3 ad 3.
28S.T., I-II, 71, 1 oJ the reterence to Aristotle within
the quotatIon 1s the tollowing' !9l!., VII, 3, 246'0, 23.

4-1
Acoording to Aquinas, virtue can be considered according to its
essence or its object.

He turther divides the consideration

according to essence into what virtue directly signifies and what
result it achiaves.
Virtue oan be direotly defined as a disposition of a subjeot
whioh is wall-disposed acoording to its nature.

In terms ot its

oonsequence, virtue can be detined as the diepositio Eertecti
optl~

~

where the Eertectum is that which has been disposed ac-

oordin.g to its nature.

The result ot virtue 1s the goodness it

oonveys as a tormal perteotion.

The object ot virtue is a good

act.
The signlfioant element in this passage is a direct statement by Saint Thomas in his prinoipal work that virtue is
~itio

2erfecti !S oEtimum.

The further explanation of

dis2~

2erfect~

is consistent with the discussion ot the term a~ead1 rendered. 29
It should be noted in passing that Saint Thomas here also treats
virtue in the context ot moral virtue.
In the light ot the texts examined in this chapter it is
now possible to see what answers have been provided to the questiona lett bY' Chapter II tor further development and whether any
new questions have been raised.

An

initial set or questions con-

cerned the definition ot virtus, di8208itio 2ertecti
Two questions were asked.

~ opti~.

First, is the above definition actual17

290f. above, pp. 11-12.

central?

Since it aopears in a treatment concerning the theologi-

cal, intellectual" and moral virtues, is it perhaps a definition
of virtue as a habit rather than virtue in general?
chapter

has

conri~ed

uses of virtual
...

that the definition encompasses all genuine

Three times 30 the definition was explicitly

stated, twice 31 as a general detinition of virtue.
Commentarz

~

The present

lh!

In the

Sentences, a claar distinction was drawn between

two definitions ot virtue, one general and the other particular,
and

dis~osltio pertac~! ~

virtue in general.3 2

oetimum was given as the definition of

Elsewhere virtue was defined as a "determi_

nation of potency to aot"33 and "wb.e.t determines an operative
potenoy to specitic types of aet,"34 both ot which detinitions
are equivalent to

~i8positio perrect~ ~

optimum.

The second question about the central definition was this:
will a further study at Saint Thomasts writings reveal that he
uses the term virtu. in connection with potencies which are not
operative?

Again the answer must be in the atfirmative.

Aquinas

disoussed in two textslS the virtue ot potency for being.

In

30In III Sent., 23, 1, 3, 801. 1: S.T •• I-II, 2 ad 3. _Ibld.,

10.-

-

~

--

31In III ~., 2), 1, 3, sol. 1, ~_!., I-II, 71, 1 c.
32!e III

ll!_!.,

!!ai., 23, 1, 3, 801. 1.
I-II, SS, 1 o.

~In II !!ei., 27, 1, 1 sol.1 ~., 1 ad 3.
lSIn III Sent., 23, 1, 3, sol. 1 ad 1:

1.1.,

SS, 2 c.
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one 36 he explained why it was legit1mate to talk about such a
virtue.

Virtue is that which determines a potency to a single

thing,

e~d

potency to being is determined to one thing, the act

or existence.

This type of virtue is virtue only by analog1,

since the disposition of potency for existence is not the same as
the dis2ositio of the definition. 37
A

second set ot questions inquired whether the central defi-

nition38 and its important terms could be clarified.
tant term has been clarified.

Each impor-

Dis2ositio, as a first act, is a

formal perfection, as a second act, it is with the subject patenoy a principle of operative activity.39
essary.

Both notions are nec-

Virtue is a formal determination, not exclusively in the

sense ot formal cause, but especially in the sense that form is
the principle of efficient activity.

-

The meaning ot

eerfe~~~

is

1 ad 1.
-Vir. in Com ,lad 9, where
a distinction 1s drawn

)6In III Sent •• 23. 1, ),

801.

37cf. De
between the drspositTOn~matter tor act and the disposition
whioh is identical with virtue.

Jarhe central definition d1sposit10 perfeoti ad optimum was
paraphrased in a Marietti edition as -QIspositio complens potentiam ad eliciendum actum bonum. M Tbe complens potentiam ad eliciendum actum emphasizes that virtue i8 what completes the potency
enabling it to act as it does. The obvious example is the human
intellect. This power by nature is open to all being. To explain
specific acts of knowing--wny the poet looks at the sun and thinks
verse, the chemist looks at the same objeot and thinks formulas-requires the notion of virtue as habit. ct. Saint Thomas Aquinas,
StmI'IU. TheolOfiae, I-II, ed. De Rubeis, et ale (Turin: Marietti,
lCJJiBJ,

p. ~ •

39!! II Sen~ •• 27, 1, 1 ad 3.
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found to be developed in terms ot the phrase "secundum naturam."40

When the subject power has been perteoted b,. virtue, it has been
tormally determined in a manner suitable to its nature.

In tbe

case ot totall,. active potencies, the virtue is the nature itselt;
in the case ot habituated potencies, tbe power is enabled to act
more tully in acoord with its nature.

Pinal11, it has been twice

affirmed that optimum is the operative act and not an object.41

A third .et ot questions was thus statedt

are there usage.

ot virtus not mentioned in the central text? Are the usages ot
the oentral text the most important or are there other important
usages to be diSCOYfU"ed? De Virtutibua
oategories:

!!! ....Oommwl
...
· ....·;;;;,;o;;.i

lists three

the virtue ot totally active potencies, tbat ot

purely passive potenoies, and that ot habituated potenoies.
Three usages not reducible to these haye been uncovered.

Besides

the virtue ot potenoy to being, alrea4T treated, virtue as operative aot and virtue as objeot were enoountered.

But both were

given by Saint Thomas as uses b1 others; not oonsistent with his

own teohnical use ot tbe term.42 There do, ot course, remain
other use. ot the term virtue in the writings ot Aquinas which
have not

~et

appeared.

The ensuing chapter will be devoted to

their studT.
1 sol.1 Ibid., 1 ad 3.
4l~q III !!!l., 23, 1, 3, sol. 1,

40Ibi4.,

--

42S•T., I-II, SS, 1

ad 1.

]!

!!t., ~, 3

ad 3.

From the examples of virtue used in the texts so far seea,
it becomes obvious that two types ot virtue are primary in the
mind of Aquinas--the natural potencies and the habits.

Among

Thomistic examples ot virtue, purely passive potencies are conspicuous by their absence.
To the classitication or virtues given in the central text,
thr•• alternatives are ottered in the texts seen in this chapter
--virtues ordained to being and those ordained to operation,~3
virtues ordained to one act and those ordained to many acts,~
and virtues ordained to transient operation and those ordained to

_.

.....

immanent operation.45 The scheme ot De Virtutibus in Oommuni
still seems more adequate.

It is more consistent with the essen-

tial derinition ot virtus
than the tirst alternate since it does
,
not include virtus or potenoy to being, an analogous usage ot the
term. furthermore it is equally comprehensive as and more extensive than the la8t two.
The

tinal questions conoern the context ot the central tex.t.

Is there a certain primaoy in the mind ot Saint Thomas to be
attributed to the virtues which are habits' All eigh~6 or the
43In III

!!2!.,

~.!., I-II,

2), 1, ), 101. lJ

SS,

1_1.,

I-II, SS, 2 c.

1 c.

4SD! .Y.!.£., 14, ).
46ne Ve~., ~, 31 In II Eth., 51 In II Sent., 27, 1, 1; In
III Sent:; ~ 1, 3, lol:-J., lli!(I., 101;-)1 !.!., I-II, SS,
~~J ~., 11, 1.
-

1,-

46
texts cited in the course of this chapter are in the context of
virtue as a habit.
to be

~.s.

At first flush. then, the answer would seem

And ret could the evidence be ciroumstantial? In no

place does Saint Thomas explicitl, recognize any primacy, logical
or metaphysical, tor virtue as habit.

Suttice it to say here that

the conclusion of this study will be that no such primacy should
be acoorded the virtues which are habits, that there exists a
more plausible explanation of the context of these passages.

The

conoluding ehapter ot the thesis will treat tbe matter more thoroughly, since the question about primacy ot usage oan be best
answered atter all the usages ot v1rtus in the writings of Saint
Thomas have been studied.
What, then, are the questions which will guide the discussIons In the subsequent chapters? First, there is the question
about the context ot all the passages concerning virtue in general.

Is virtue taken as a habit to be accorded some kind ot

primacy?

This question will be answered in the concluding chapter

Secondly, are there uses ot virtue still to be encountered?

The

following chapter will be devoted to answering this question.
Finalll. there is tbe minor question whether there are any other
inatances in the writings ot Saint Thomas ot the second oategoF,T

ot the central text, tbe virtues ot purel7 passive potencies.

CHAPTER IV

THE DERIVED USAGES OF VIRTUS IN THE WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS

The fOUJ.'l'th chapter of this thesis will be devoted to a
study of the usages 01' the term virt'!! not already mentioned in
the prior chapters.

With the aid ot the lexicons of Schutz1 and

Deferrari-Barr7,2 nine distinct meanings ot the subject term in
•

I

r •

lRvirtus_.a) Kraft. Vermogen, Fahlgkeit, d.i. nacbates
PriDCip einer Thatigkeit, SplODym mit potentia, potestaB und vis.
b} personificierte Kraft. d.1. Kraft 1m Sinne eines peraonlichen
wesenaf. c) Kratt, Macht, Moglicb.kelt zu einem Sein, synonJ"Dl mit
potent a, del' Gegenaatz r.u actus, und habitua, d) Tuchtigkeit,
Tugend, alllonym mit bonitas und pertectio, e) Tugend dea m.enBchen
1m Sinne eineahabitus, del' Gegensatz zu malitia und vl:bium,
t) Kratt, Starke, Macht, aynoft1m mit tortitudo, potentia und vis,
g} hoch.ete ICPattleistung, hochate Leistung, aynon,.. mit !'ortitudo
und potential h) wunderbare Krattleiatunf' Wunder, 8ynony:m mit
miraculum; 1) Sinn. Bedeutung. synonym a t intellectua, ratio,
sensua, signitloatio und vis.
Ludwig Schutz Thomaa-Lexikon,
2nd ed. (New York: MUaurgia Publishers, n.d.J, pp. 852-6$ pasaim.
2"(1) Power, taoult7, aptitude, or capaoity. the proximate
principle of actiVity, aynoD1BS ot potentl~, potestaa, vis, (2)
Personified power, i.e. power in the aense ot a personal being,
() Power, might, potentiality in a being, synonJM ot potentia and
potestas, the oppoaite ot actus and habitus, (4) Ability, virtue,
aynonym of bonitaa and pertectio, (S) TM virtue of man in the
aense of a habitus, the opposite of malitia and vitium, (6) Power,
strength, might, synolQ'm of fortitudo, potentia, and vl.S, (7) Tb.&
bighest feat ot 8trengtb tne highest accomplishment, synonym ot
fortitudo and potentiar 8) A wondertulteat of strength, wonder,
SynOD1JB ot miraculum, 9) Sense, meaning, S1ll0nymot intellectua,
ratio, senaus, sign1tioatio, and vis." Roy J. Deterrari & Siater
M. Inviolata Barry, O.D.P., A Lexicon 01' SaiDt Thomas A3uinas,
(WaShington: Catholio univeraity 01 AmerIca 'reas, 194 J, ·P.
1159.

e
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the wri1-,ings ot Saint Thomas oan be listed:

(1) proximate prin-

ciple ot activity, (2) personitied power; (3) power or potency
(as opposed to act or habit), (4) goodness, (S) good habit as
opposed to vice), (6) strength; (1) highest teat of strength;

(8) tbe miraculous, (9) meaning.

The f1rst, tourth, and titth

bave a11'8ad,. been enoountered and discussed (the texts oi tec:l tor
:mmlber (4). "goodness," being pusage. in which. Aquina8 explains
that virtue oan be defined aa "pert.otio potentiae").
remain. then 8ix meaninga atill to be treated.
ment will be ttl. following:

There

The order ot treat ..

tirst, the personified

POW&:;:'s 01"

angels will be disoussed.in oonjunotion with a closely allied
meaning, miraole.

Seoondly. the use ot virtue as power will be

examined; this meaning enoampasses three familiar u.ages .... the
pre.enoe of element. in a oompound, the relation.b.ip of oonolu..
sions to their premises, and the influenoe ot a principal oause
on i t8 instrument.

Thirdl,., somem!scellaneous employments of the

term--virtue signifying meaning and strength, the latter of whioh
irlcludes the use 01' virtue in regard to cause and etfect--will be
treated.

Finally. virtul as limit or highest fea.t ot strength

will be investigated.
In the writings of Saint Thomas ...
virtus frequently is a
synon,.. for angel.

Although the term is most orten applied to a

particular or-der, it can reter to all angels:

Vir-tUB autam dupliciter accip! potest. Uno modo, communitel', seoundum quod est media inter essentla:m et operationeun
et sio omnes caelestes spiritus nominantur oaelestes virtu-
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tea, sicut et caelestes essentia.. --Alio modo, secundum
quod import at quendam excessum tortitudinis: et sic est
proprium nomen ordinis.)
There is a general 8ense in which all angels are properly oalled
virtues.

TheY' are a middle ground between essence and operation,

a conjecture by the author ot the thesis is that the probable

meaning of this phrase i. that angela mediate between the divine
plan and its application to particular ettecta.

This notion ot

virtue as a mean between essence and operation 1s similar to the
use ot tbe term virtue tor a habit which mediates between the
••••nce ot a taculty and it. operation.
Virtua, however, when used to signify an angel, more commonly reters to a specitic order within a hierarchy.

The reaaon tor

the usage given in the text cited above is that of pseudo-Dion1sius.4 In more ample discussions ot virtue applied to a particular order ot angels, Saint Thomas explains more tully whl he
believes the order is appropriate11 named.
Virtus can signlfJ either of two orders.

fhe one specified

depends on the scheme employed--whether .1t 1s that ot pseudo-Diony-sius or that ot Gregory the Great.

For the tormer, the middle

order ot the second hierarcb1 merited the title Virtute., tor the
latter, the same title belonged to the tirst order ot tbe third

3!.!., I, 108, $, ad 1.
4"Unde Dion1sius dicit quod namen Virtutum signiticat quandam virilem et inconcussam tortitudinem • • • • ft Ibid. The retex-ence to pseudo-Dionysius witb.in tbe quotation is: !1.,g;.,),

PP. 20$tt'.

So
hierarohy.

Some background will be

ordera ot angels were named,.
there were tbree

hie~arohies

ne~essar1

on how the various

According to pseu4o-D,.oDJsiua.5

ot angelic spirits.

Since angels are

spiritual beings. each hierarch,. had two specitio taska:, one
intelleotual,. the othel' .,.0111;ion&1. 6 The tirst h1eraNb.J oontemplated the universe 1n the ess.noe ot God and then oonaidePed tbe
end ot oreation.

Tb.e secol1d order cont.mplated 0.e&t10n in its

universal causes and oared tor the seneral dispoaition ot its
impleMntation.

The third order understood oreation in terms ot

the oreaturea thUlselves and curied out the details

ot

tbe

d1 vine plan.
POI'

pseudo-DlonJsius,. the virtues belonged to the seoond.

h1eraron,.1

For tbis group,. the general dispos1tion ot oreation

$"Primo 191tur videamua rationam ass1gnationis Dion1811.
In qua consideran4um est quod sieut supra diotum e.t, prima
tder8.1'Ohia &Geipit rationes rel'UJl in ipso Deo, aecunda vero in
cau.i. univeraalibUa, tertia vero a.oundua deteratnatlonem ad
speciales ettectus. .t quia Deua e.t tlnis non solum angelicol'Wl
m1rdsteriol'Ull aed etiam totius creaturu. ad prim. . bierarchiam
pertiDet consideratio tl11is, ad _41_ vero disposl tio un1.e:&'aalia 4e agendis, ad ult!_ aut_ applicatl0 41spoaltlonis ad
effeotua, quae ••, operia eaoutio, haeo en1m tria manit••tum .st
in quallbet operatione inY8n1ri~- Ibid., 6 o.

I..

'"Dioqralua exponi' ordlnua nomina aeoundum oGn.en1entl88
ad .plritua1e. parteotlone. eorwa." Ibid., S o. The retePen.. to
pseudo-DI0D7siu8 within tbe qUMation
la-i., 3, pp. 205tt.

l-Ad aubernationi. aut.. ration.. tria pertinent. ~orua
primum e.t d.tin! tl0 eol'Ull qua. asenda aunt. quod .st propriUll
DaminatioDUm. Seoundum aute. ea' pl'ubere taoultatem ad implendum. quod partinet ad Vil'tutea. Tertium aut_ e.t ordinare qualiter ea quae prae.epta vel d.etinita auot, impleri possint. ut
ali qui exequantU1" et b.oo pertine' act Pote.tate •• " ibid.., 6 e.
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entailed th1'ee duties:

(1) to detel'mine what had to be done,

(2) to present a £aculty ready to exeoute the task, (3) to designate how the divine dacrees were to be executed.

The second duty.

npraebere taeultatem ad implendum. n was the special property ot
the Virtues.
meaning ot the

This use of virtus has ita baais in the essential
t&~.

Virtus is a tormal determination to opera-

tion, it indicates that the power is fully prepared to aot.
pU1"pose ot the heavenlY' Virtutes is similar.
a power ready

~o

The

They had to provide

carry out the divine precepts.

Aocording to Gregory the Great. who named the angels acoording to theil~ ministries. 8 virtu. more properly described the

tirst order of the third hier~h1.9

In the exeoution of the di-

vine plan. it was their ministry to perform the mir",eulous.
the

~ompendium

In

Theolosiae. Saint Thomas amplities wbJ Gregory can

legitimately use virtus to desoribe this order:
Sueremus autem bujus bierarchiae ordo secundum Gregorium •
• • vtr'iutes dieuntur ex eo quod as. quae sunt supra naturam
operiiTEur. in argumentum eorum quae nobis supra rationem
nuntiantur: unde ad virtutes pertinere diei tUX' miraoula
t8.08re. 10
In tne Gregorian scheme the Virtues are the angels wno operate
SnGregorius vero, in exposition. horum nominum, magis attendere videtup exteriora miniateria." Ibid., S c. The reference to
GregoPJ within the quotation is: !.~:;-76, 1250, 12510-d.
9nPost quas sunt Virtutes, quae habent potestatem super oorporalem naturam in operatione miraculorum.- Ibid., 6 c. The
re.ferenGe to Gregory is the same as in tn. prevIous citation.
10iomr. Theol., I, 126. The reterenee to Gregory is the
same as nba previous oitations.

over and above nature.

They pertorm miracles.

based on a similarity to virtue as habit.

This usage is

A power which is by

nature open to all being is by habit determined to specific modes

ot operation.

Thus habit is something over and above the nature

ot the power.

Since miracles require a power which is capable of

what is over and above the natural, the working of miracles is
attributed to the Virtues.
In this context it will be suitable to discuss an allied
usage of virtus, the eighth sense listed above, as sJnonomous
with miracle.

Saint Thomas tella us that a miracle is "aliquid

excedens taoultatem naturae.

Et secundum hoc, miraoula dicuntur

virtutes."ll Miracles exceed the capability ot nature.
they are called virtuea.
this uae ot virtus.

Thus

Three explanations can be proterred tor

First, the phrase "excedens facultatem natu-

rae" indicates a similarity to virtue as habit, habit is something
over and above the nature of a power, so is a miraole.

Seoondly,

this may be a case where the name ot the operant, the angelic
Virtue, has been attributed to the operation, the miraole.
Finally, virtus 'was used in the thirteenth oentury as a synonym
for miraculum.12 Sinoe the usage is infrequent in thG works ot
Saint Thomas, it would be difficult to discern wh1ch of the above
reaaona was Saint Thomas's for using the term.
ll!_!_, II-II, 178, 1, ad J.
12J.H_ Baxter & Oharles Johnson, Medieval Latin Word-List,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934), P. 4>8.
-

Besides virtue signifying angel and miracle, a common usage
of the term in Thomistic writings is virtue as power or potency,
the third sense distinguished above.
torms.
~hese

This usage takes three

The first concerns tne presence 01' elements in a compound.
are said to be present virtUally (virtute).

In one text1)

Saint Tnomas considers three opinions bow elements exist in a comFirst. he considers the opinion of Avicenna.~ The Arab

pound.

pbilosopner maintained that the substantial torms

01'

the elements

are actually present in the compound; eacb substantial torm is
subordinate to the foP.m ot the compound while actuating a separate
portion

01'

the prime matter.

Saint Thomas rejects this opinion.

He insists that, it the substantial .torms are actually present,
and each actuates its own portion of the matter, no compound exis.ts, but only a conglomeration of separate elements.
opinion is that of' Averroes. 1 ,$

131_!., I, 76, 4,

ad

The

next

According to tbe Oommentator. the

4.

14"Avicenna posuit tormas 8ubstantiales elementorum integras
remanere in mixto: mixtionem autem tieri secundum quod contrariae
qualitates elemento~Im reducuntur ad medium.--Sed noc est impossibile. Q.uia diversae tormae elementorum non possunt esse nisi in
diversis partibus materiae, ad quarum diversitatem oportet intelligi dimensiones, sine quibus materia divisibilis e8se non potest.
Materia autem dimension! subjecta non invenitur nisi in corpore.
Diversa autem corpora non possunt esse in eadem loco. Unde sequitur quod elementa sint in mixto distincta secundum situm. Et ita
non erit vera mixtio, quae est secundum totum: sed mixtio ad sensUM, quae est seoundum minima juxta 8e pOBi ta. " !2.!.!!.
lSuAverroes flutem posuit, in III de Caelo, quod tormae olewentorum, propter sui impertectionem, Bunt mea!ae inter tormas
accidentales et substantialesJ et ideo recipiunt magis et minus,
et ideo remi ttuntur in mixtione et ad medium reducuntur, et con-

5!~

torms ot elements are present in a manner midway between substantial and accidental form; tne substantial forms of the elements
az-e gradually diminished until they merge into the one substan-

tial form 01' the compound.
two counts.
dent.

Saint Thomas rejects this opinion on

First. there is no mean between substance and acci-

Secondly, substantial existence cannot be reduced; exis-

tence admits only 01' being and non-being.

Finally Saint Thomas

states the opinion of Aristotle:
Et ideo dicendum est, secundum Philosopbum in I de Generat.,
quod tOP.mae elementorum manent in mixto non aotu;-sed vIrtute. Manent en1m qualitatespropriae elem.entorum licet
remissae, in quibus est virtue form8.rum elementariu.m. Et
bujusmodi qualltas mixtionis est propria dispositio ad to~
mam substantlalem COrPoris mixti, puta tormam lapldis. vel
animas oujuseumque. 1bThe

torms ot elements are present virtually, not actually, in a

compound.

What does this mean?

First, the properties ot the

elements are truly present although in a. diminished manner.

Th.e

properties ot the compound are determined by the properties ot
its composing elements.

These properties can be explained onl,.

in tems ot the virtus ot tb.e ele.ments in their free state, i.e ••
they are the natural outpourings of the SUbstantial torm which is
tlatur ex eis una torma .....Sed hoe est etiam magis imposaibile.
Nam esse substantiale oujuslibet rei in indiviaibili eonsistltJ
at omnia additio et subtractio variat speciem, sieut in numeris,
ut dieltur in VIII Metaphrs. Unde impa.sibile est quod £orma
substantialis quaecumque recipiat magis et minus.--Neo minus est
imposslbile aliquid eSS8 medium inter sUbstantiam at aooidens."
Ibid.

-

16Ib1d.

The referenoe to Aristotle within the quotation 1s
~ Gener~!l Oorrupt., I, 10, )27b, 29-31.
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disposed to operate in speoifio ways.

Although the substantial

.forms cease to exist in the oompound, the dispositions remain.
Aquinas elsewhere explains in more detail tlle nature ot this
virtual presence:
Conslderandum est igitur quod qualitates aotivae et passivae elementorum contraria. sunt ad invicem et magis et
minus reoipiunt. Ex oontrarils autem qualitatibus quae
racipiunt magis at minus oonatltui poteat media qualitas
quae sapiat utriusqt~ oxtremi naturam, siout pallidum inter
album et n1grua, et tepldum inter oalldum et trigldum. Sic
igitur, nmissis exoellentiis qualitatum elementarium, oonstltl1itur ex hi. quaedam ql1al1ta. media qua. est pPOpria
qualitas corporis mixti, di1"terens tamen in diversis se(umdum diversam mixtionis proportionem, at haec quidem qualitas
est propria dispositio ad tormam oorporis mixti, sicut qualitas simplex ad formam corporis siMpliois. Siout igitur
extrema inveniuntur in- medio, quod partioipat naturaItl utri ..
usque J sic qualitates simp11cium corporum lnveniuntur 1n
propria qualitate corporis mixti. Qualitas autemsimpliels
oorporis .st quidem aliud a tONa substantial! ipsiua J ag1 t
tamen in virtute formae substantialis, alioquin calor cale.faceret tantumJ non aute. per ejus actionem forma substantialis educeretur in aotum, cum nihil agat ultra suam speciem.
Sic igltur virtutes tormarum sUbstantialium simplicium
oorporum in oorporibt18 mutis salvantur. Sunt igitur formae
elementol."'Um. in oorporibus mixt!. non quidem actu, sed virtute, .t hoc est quod dicit Aristoteles in primo de GeneI'.
'Non manent igitur elementa in mixtoaotu ut corpUS et
album, nec cor~tur nec e.lte~ nec ambo: salvatur
enim virtue eorum.'17
Again the discussion is in terms of the properties ot the elements
in e. free state and those ot the compound.

The properties 01" the

compound are not identical with those of the elements in a free
state; yet they are determined by the propert1.es ot the elements.
The properties of the elements are not ac tuall;y present in the
17De Mtxt. Elem •• S; the reference to Aristotle 1s the same
as in the prev{ous oitation.
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compound since they u.ndergo alterations; yet th.ey a.rtect the properties of the compound.

As a oonsequence, some middle ground

must be sought tor explanation; this middle ground is the virtual
presence of elements in a compound.
The key phrase for understanding in what

t~is

virtual pres-

ence oonsists is "virtutes formarun substantialium simplieiwG oor-

porum in corporibus mixtis salvantur."

The

dispositions of' the

substantial forms tor their proper operations are still present.
The substantial form is not present_ but itsvirtus or determine.
tion to proper act remains.
An

example of' virtual presence in the writings of Saint

Thomas io the inolusion of the prinoiple ot sensation in manta
rational soul. 18 Sensation 1s truly present in man--men l~ally
see,

hea~,

eto.--althougn in a modified form; i.e., sensation is

ordered to intelleotion in

hur~

aotivity.

Thus the sensitive is

said to be virtuall, present--all tne proper operations al'$ evident:

seeing, hearing, eto., but in a modified form.

Th.e dispo-

a1 tiona tor certain acts remain even thougn they emanate fItom a.
rational soul.

The sensitive principle is virtuall1 present,

1.e., the presence ot ita power is evident trom the operations
proper to it.
This usage ot virtue is close to the eaoential detinition.
Since the properties ot the compound are determined by the proper-
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ties of the elements, the elements are said to be virtual11 present.

Although the substantial forms of the elements no longer

exist. their detel"'minationa to specific operations remain.

This

condition is described as the virtual presence of elements in the
compound.
Another usage ot virtue as power is the pres.nce of conclusions in principles.

About this phenomenon. Saint Thomas sa7s:

Unde quando ali qua multa virtute continetur in al1quo uno
dicuntur esse in lllo implicite, aicut conclusiones in prIncipiis. EXplicite autem in aliquo continentur quod in eo
actu existit: unde ill. qui oognoscit aliqua prinoipia
universalia habet 1mp1icitam cognitionem de omnibus conc1usionibua particularibus t qui aute. conolusionea actu considerat, dicitur ea explicit. cognoscere.19
A man who understands the universal prinoiples ot a science has
implicit knowledge ot conolusions.

Whan be draws the necessary

cODClusions, be haa exp1ioitknovledse.

But betore he draws the

ooncluaiona, how are theT contained in the prinoiples? Saint
Thomas answers tbat oonolusions are virtually present in the
prinoiples trom whioh the1 are drawn.
What is the nature of this virtual presence? An example
trom contempor&r7 mathematics will illustrate what is meant.

A

mathematician, who thoroughl1 understands the detinitions of real,
imaginary, and complex numbers, the totalit1 of finite numbers,
can draw the oonolusion that all tinite Dumbers are oomplex. 20

--

19De Ver.,

14,

11 o.

20.A, oomplex number is a number wb.:l.cb. oan be written in the
form a + bl. It a is equal to aero, tnen we have an imaginary
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How was the conclusion present in the three detinitions?

Cer-

ta1nly not in act since the detini tion of complex numbers does
not state anything about these numbers' including the other two.
Nor is the conclusion there in

pure

potency:

given the three

definitiona, the most logical conclusion is that the class complex includes the other two.
ground must be sought.
The

As a consequence, a sort of middle

This middle ground is virtual presence.

conclusion is present in the power or virtue ot thorough

understanding ot the d.etini tions to induce tb.8 lntelle ct to make
tbe proper interence.
Conclusions are also present in tirst principles.
In quibus Licientlla speculatlv~87 conclusionss virtute
continentur in primis principiis. unde qui pertecte cognosceret principia secundum totam suam virtutem, non opus
haberet ut e1 concluaiones seorsUM pPOponeretur. Sed quia
non omoe. qui cognosount principia sutticiunt considerare
quidquid in prinoipiis virtute continetur, neoe.se 8st
propter eos ut in acienti18 ex principiis conclusiones
deducantur. 21
In speculative sciences, conclusions are virtuall1 present in tbe
tirst principles.

The man who knows tirst principles in the

fullness ot their power does not have to draw conclusions.
An example

~om

the experience of the author ot the tbesis

will again illustrate what is meant.

In the speculative science,

nUftibe~.
It b is equal to zero, tben we bAve a "ealnumbsl-.. :«It
neither a nor b 1s equal to zero, then W8 have a oomplex number
~hicb is neither real nor imaginary.
As a consequence, complex
number 1. inclusive of both real and imaginarr number.

21!.!., II-II, 44, 2 c.
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philosophy, a tirst principle is "Act is not limited except by
the potency in which it is received."

The philosopher who tully

understands this principle can draw several conclusions:

pure

aot must be totally unlimited, given the ditterence in levels ot
being, e.g., plants, beasts, men, there must ba grades ot dependance ot the actual principle on the potential; in all limited
beings, there must be 80me distinction between potency and act.
The philosopher, who adequately understands what aot, limit, and
potenoy mean, can readily draw the above conolusions.
are the conclusions present in th. principle?

Yet how

The man who tho-

roughly understands the principle has the power to draw the conclusions.

In the understanding ot the principle, there is a dis-

position or determination to the oonclusions.
consists.

In this the virtue

The understanding ot the principles is a tirst act

trom which emanates a second act, the drawing of the conclusions.
A final il18tance ot virtu.
as power is the presence of a
••

principal cause in the instrument.

Saint Thomas explains the

nature ot this virtual presence in the third part of the Summa in
reply to a difficulty:
Instrumentum habet duas actiones I unam instrumentalem, secundum quam operatur non in virtute propria, sed in virtute
prinoipal!s agential ali am autem habet actionem propriam,
quae competi t sibi secundum propriam formam; sicut securi
competit scinder. ratione suae acuitatls. !aeere ~uc.em lectum inquantum est instrumentum artis. 22
In this passage the action of an instrument Which proceeds from

--

22S.T •• III, 62, 1. ad 2.
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its own substantial torm and that which
external source are contrasted.

p~ooeeds

trom a power or

A typewriter, for instance, is

oapable of itself not even of making oertain impressions

~n papa~.

Under the influenoe of a principal cause, however, it can compose
a thesis.

When the typewriter is printing a thesis, something is

present over and above what it natural17 possesses.
thing is the virtual presence or the principal cause.

This someThe prin-

cipal agent is not actually present; the author of the thesis 1s
not a

t1Pewr~.ter.

Yet the agent is somehow there; he is virtually

present by his power moving the typewriter to type the appropriate Words.
In a seoond text Saint Thomas amplifies this ideal
Alio modo aliquid opers.tur ~d efteotum aliquem instruments.liter, quod quidem non operatur ad effeotum per formam sibi
inhaerentem, sed solum in quantum est motum a par sa agent••
Haeo ent. est ratio instrumenti, in quantum est inatrumentum, ut moveat motum: unde sicut se habet forma oompleta ad
per se agentem, ita 8e habet motus quo movetur a principali
agente, ad instrumentum, sicut serra operatur ad soamnum.
Quamvi8 enim serra habeat aliquam actionem quae sibi competit secundum propriam formam, lit diVider., tamen aliquam
affectum habet qui 8ibi non competit nisi in quantum est
mota ab artifice, scilicet facere reotam incisionem, et
oonvenientem forma. artis, et a10 instrumentum habet duas
operationes: unam quae campetit ei secundum formam ppoppiam, aliam quae competit ei seoundum quod est motum a per se
agents, quae transcendit virtutem propriae tormae. 2l
The essence of an instpument, Saint Thomas explains. is tnat it
1s moved and moves simultaneously.

A knite, for exanwle, by

nature is a tool for cutting, in the hands of a surgeon, however,

23B! !!t., 27, 4 c.
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it becomes an instrument tor making a delicate incision in the
human anatam,.
its performanoe.

Thus the surgical knife possesses two aspects in
The

tirat asp.ct is the outting which 1s natural

to it, the second is the exoising diseased tissue, which belong.
to it only beoause it 1s moved by the principal cause.

The

inat:Mmlent acts by reason ot both. its own power and that ot the
principal cause.

This latter power is over and beyond what the

inatrument naturally possesses.

Thus it baa a virtue.-. disposi.

tion placed in the inatrument by the principal cause wbereby it
achieve. sometbing beyond what it ia ordained to do by nature.24.
There are several miscellaneous usag.s ot virts! by Saint
Thomas.

First, .ttects are present in their cause. virtually:

"Roo aute. eat proprium Dei, ut sua •• aent1a ait immaterialiter
comprebenaiva omnium, prout ettactus virtute pra••x1stunt in oaus&."25

The

cause oan alao

be

virtuallJ present in the etteot:

"Aliquis actus dicitur durar. duplioiter:

aut seoundum ••••nt1..'

aut ••oundum virtute. sive .ttectum auua • • • • ~26 The en.uing
illustration i. that ot a man throwing a rock. While he is aotuall,. throwing, the act endul'-es in its .s.enoel atter the rook
24."ae)nf moved ,ua inatl'Ullent. however, i. p1'$cise11 tbat
formalit!' o· he orea UP. aoiron wlieNby it transoends its own
propep oapabilities." Francia X. Meehan, Effioient Oausality in
Ax-istotl. and Saint Thomas (Waahington, D"a: datFiolio tfnlveJ:tsIi,.
or AtIlep10a""1'Pe8s. 1(46), P. 299.
2S~,,! •• I, ~, 2 o.

261. IV Sent., 1S. ~, 2, sol. 3.
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l.av.a tbe man'a hand, the act baa duPation ot virtue or erreot.
Finally, vil'tua ia ocoaalonall,. used to aignltJ meaning: . "'Spirl tus Sanetus. .. • • quantWi ad v1l'tute. vOcabulol'UDl • • • conve-

nt, tot1 Trln1tat1 • • • • "21 Saint Thomaa 1s anawering an objection that tbe term Holy 8p11'1 t abould not be applied to tbe
third person. but to the entlre Trinl t7.
attend onl,. to the meanlns

or

He

anewer. that it we

tbe worda ...... ad Yirtut.. yooabulorumlt

-.tben Hol,. 8p11-1t _,. reter to the entlre TriAit"'e

Virtue, as signltJi.na the presence of an etfeot ln ita
oa118., .. srnonomoua with etteot, and ... ind10ating meaning, Td.ll
nov be anal7zed.

tbe aenae tbat,

An ettect is vl"uall,. present lnlts oause in
al~ough

it 408a not ,.et actuall,. exist. lt oan

cOlle lnto existeno. throuab. tbe callae J the.. al"a4,. exiata in
tbe cause a det.rmlnedrelat1onatbip betw••n th. oaus. and tbe
erteot tsbat can be produced,

'l!b.e oaus. llkewi •• perdurea acoord-

tng to .. virtual pH.ence in it. ettect,' that la, lta ettl01en'
oauaa11t7 re-.1na operative atter 1t. cauaal operation baa oeaae4.
The act1rl", ot tbe etrect 18 not to'al17 1nteUi31b1e except 1n
teJ'J118 of tbe oauae, ttwa a determ1ne4 relationship exists between
the ette.t and its oause, and tor tbi. reason
aU,. be a a1ftoDJll

t01ft

etteot.

~ptus

oan oooasion-

Pinall,., the meanina ot a vop4 ma,.

be oalled ita yil'tue, the vooable haa tbe power to PPOyoke meaning.

Beeauae meaning can be inte1ftre4 from ttle word., a detinite

27!! I Sent., 10, 1, 4, ad 1.
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relationship can be aacertained between a word and its mean1ng,
and an instance ot virtue i8 in evidence.
PinallY', virtue oan be a a11lonJ'll tor peak ot powett.

TMa

u8age is summarlzed in tb. tamiliar detinition ot v1rtu. as "ulti_

in re de potentia."

Saint Thomaa explains the

-antns

ot thia

usage in tbe tollowing pasaase.
Ad pr1m1 au~ manitestat1on. . d10it quod, a1 contingat
aliquu rem poase in ali quid magnum, puta quoad aliquia
bomo ambUlet per .entum stadia, aut poaa1 t i.vare aUqu04
magn\UI pondue, aemper d.etel"l81naaua a1" 4eD0JII1:Da11W1 .Jua
potentia per respectum ad pluriJaNa in quod potest, .lout
d10tmua potentla. ~jQ. bomini. •••• quod pot•• t 1eYare
pondu. oent_ talentorum, aut quod pot••t ire pel' apatlum
oentum stadiorum, quamvia po.att
parte. lntPa latam
quantitatem oontenta., alquldem pot•• t in 14 quod superabundat • • • •
Slc 191tBr patet quod l1le qui pote.t 1n ea quae exoeliunt, ne.e.s. e.t quod poa.lt et1am in ea quae aunt
int'l'a. puta al a11qu1. poteat port&n centum. talenta, poterit etiam porta".. duo, et .1 poteat iN per oentWl .tadia,
pote.t ire per duo: .ed tamen vl:rtua ..e1 non attrlbuitur
rd.l exoellentlae, ld.at, .eoundum 1d atten41 tur viPtua
re1, quod e.t exoellentlas1mwD omnlum e01'\11ll in quae poteBt.
Et boo e.t quod dioitu. in a11a tran.1atloae, vlrtue
.at ulti.ua t:::ntiae, quia .o1110et virtuB rei det.im!Di~ur
iiiundua ult
In "quod pote.t. Et boo etlam babet locum
in vi1'tutlb1l8 anima.: diol tur enim y1rtua humana, pel' quam
hoao pot•• t in ld quod eat exoel1entiastmum ln operibu'a
humania, 8cl11oet ln ope" quod eat seoundum 1'atlooe•• 2

cane.

Tbe notion ot viEtM as 8ign1f71ng the peak

ot a thing's power

baa lts source in tbe taot tbat potentlalit,. ia described in te1"lU

ot :ux1J1U118 and m,1n1mwu.

Ttw.e, it

a

lUll

ls ablato 11tt'ilbun-

dred pound weignt, hi. potential 1. determined as ,tbe oapaclt7'ot
litting one hundred, and not tift1 pounda even though the latteJ'
28!!! I h

9.!:.!!• .!l.!!!!4., 2S. n. 249.
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is certainly

t~ue.

Oapability is designated in terms at the maxi-

mum a person can accomplish, in other words, oapability is designated in

te~s

ot its acme.

This notion ot

vi~tus

as peak ot power, however, is not a

tusage in accord wi tn tne essential meaning at th.e term.

In tbe

central text, Saint Thomas explains this usage:
llla detinitio Philosoph! potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno
modo materialiter, ut per virtutem inte1l1gamus id in quod
virtus potest. quod est ulttmum inter ea in quae potentia
potest, sicut virtus Gjus qui potest, terre centum libras,
est in eo in quantum potest terre centum libras non in
quantum terre potest aexaginta. Alio modo potest intelligl
essentiallterJ et sic virtus dioitur ultimum potentia.,
quia de~ignat potentiae oomplementum, sive id per quod
potentia campletur, ait aliud a potentia, sive non.29
"Ultimum in re de potentia" can be understood in two ways.

Firat,

fi t can signify the peak at the oapabili ty at the virtue. A man
~o

can carry a certain weight is aaid to be able to carry that.

~d

not a lesser weight, even th.ough undoubtedly he could carry

tbe lighter amount.
or limit.
~o

Oapabilit;r is desoribed 1n terms ot maximum

The phrase, "ultimum 1n re de potentia," corresponds

the essential meaning otvirtus only it 1t 18 synonomous with

completion ot a poterur1J but this meaning ot the phrase is not
being disoussed here.
The purpose in the tirst section ot the conclusion to the
present chapter will be to olaritr and sabematize the meanings

ot virtu. examined throughout the preceding pages ot this chapter.
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The principal observation must be that the present chapter deals
with a notion of virtue somewhat different from that studied in
Chapters Two and

Chapter Four examines instances ot virtus

Three~

wbich a:re translations trom the Greek dJv«.u~ while the previous
two chapters were concerned with usages which. had their origin in
the word

~

)

Cfe.~7!l.

two meanings:

The teN

I

dUf#f<lJlI',

as tl'anslated by virtua, had

(1) active potency, i.e., tne ability to do,

(2) pasaive potenc,., i.e., an undergointb the capability ot coming into aotualitYe

!ranalatlon according to the firat meaning

vaa a more frequent ocourrence aa subsequent analysis will show.
The first section of the summary will discuss the meanings
of virtus which are translationa of

I

r/Clf!'If.J,lII.

The second part

,

will inquire wbather tbe usage. of virtus-4vm.uu
related to tbe uses of

)
I
virtu8-"Yi¥'~

t.t.re

in any va.,

and theretore to the detini-

tion of virtue heretofore described as oentral.
Tbe usages ot virtus which translate
olaasified in four oategories.
angela.

I

c/UI'It.i(lJ

can rougnl1 be

Th.e first categor,. is that of the

Here the notion of active potenol predominates.

Angels

are denominated virtues beoause they have power to perform operations.

Angels are called virtues in three senses, one general

and two particular.

In tbe general sens8, they are virtues

because they operate as intermediaries between God and His universe.30

According to p.eudo-DdoDJsius, a particular order of

66

angels oan be oalled the Virtues sinoe their function is to provide a oapacity ready to operate.31

Acoording to Gregory the

Great, another order deserves the name virtus because it has the
task of working miracles. 32

,

A seoond catego17' of virtus as d"YfV:{'1. includes the various
virtual presences.

There are, in general, three such presenoes,

the first two of which combine both the active and passive meanings ot JUY~MU, and a final ODe which specifies only the aotive
sen.e.

The first type of virtual pre.enoe i. that of elements in

a oompound.3)

In this type, virtus is discernible both in an

aotive sense (the compound acts in ways appropriate to the elements) and in a passive

~ense

(the element. can be educed from

the potency of the matter of the compound).

Seoondly, a oonclu-

sion is virtually present in the premises ot a syllogism34:

from

the viewpoint of the conclusion. it does not yet actual.ly exist,
but it can, from the viewpoint of the premises, tney are inherently capable of making the conclusion become actual.

Finally,

the presence of a principal cause in its instrument»

is an in-

stance of active peteney only:

the use of tne instrument becomes

...
3l!.!., I, 108, Comp. Theel., I, 126.
)2Ibid •

33»8 Mixt.

!!!me, >, !.!., I, 76, 4,

ad

4.

l4~. .:l.2., 14, 11 e J ! ..!., II-II, 44, 2 e.
3S~

!!E.,

27,

4 CJ !.!.,

III, 62, 1, ad 2.
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a part 01' the action 01' the principal cause; i.e., the principal's
ability is aotive in the instrument and therefore virtually
present.
A

I

number of usages of virtus as r&v;'4.l1J must be categorized

as miscellaneous.

The

first pair 01' suoh usages bears a similar-

An

ity to the virtual presence of a oonclusion in its premises.

effect is present in its oauseJ6 according to a passive potency,
it does not actually exist, but can come to exist through the
cause.

A

cause remains present in its etteot37 according to its

active potency:
actual.

it can and does make the being of the effect

Two other miscellaneous usages of virtus as cltv"ulJ are

virtue as indicative of meaning 38 and as sJllonomous with miraI

018. 39

Both uses translate r:[YVIi.uIS in l"egard to passiVe potenoy.

Virtue is equivalent to meaning inasmuoh as a meaning oan he drawn
out 01' a word.
tar as a

Virtue likewise oan signify miraculous power inso-

miraou~ous

work 1s present in a supernatural power and

there tore can OOMe to be through that power.
Finally. the category 01' virtul as the peak of potenoy40

84, 2 c.
-37!n IV ~., 15, 4, 2, sol. 3.
36S.T., I,

i~In I ~., 10, 1,

4,

ad

1, !.1., I,

29,

4

OJ

!a!2., 36,

391.1., II-II, 178, 1, ad 3.
0

I

4 1n I De Cael. et Mund.,
!!!!'!i.,-a,
~. I, ad r. -

2$, n. 249J ~., nne 2$1-2J In

-
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must be considered.

Virtue as peak of power indicates the over-

all capability of an active potency_
In almost all the usages of virtus as dJvlI{gu. virtue connotes active potency, the ability to do; in a few, undergoing or
passive potency is discernible.

In terms or causality, the type

ot cause in question tor the usages discussed in the present
chapter is efficient cause.

How then are these usages related to

those discussed in Chapters Two and Three where the notion of
formal causality predominated?

The second halt of the summary

will examine whether any relationship exists.
In Chapters Two and Three, virtus was diseositio perfecti
ad optimum.

The diseositio is a formal determination; it is a

first act.

Perfecti indicates that which. possesses this formal

disposition, an operative potency.

oetimum finally indicates

tormal disposition to proper activity or second act.

Furthermore

the most common usage of virtu. by Saint Thomas is virtue as a
habit.

A habit, it will be recalled, is something over and above

the nature ot the faculty.

Human faculties are open to all being,

a habit supnlements these faculties and specializes their determination to being.

Thus trom the general notion of virtus and its

most common usage, two interences can be made:

(1) virtue is a

determination to second act; (2) virtue frequently is something
over and beyond the nature of a power.

On the basis of these

inferences the seoondary usages are derived.
Virtus can be applied to angels sinoe anY' angel is an inter-
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mediate between essence and operation.4l

Virtue as a habit is

something which is superadded to the essence ot the subject power
and with it determines operation.
to two orders ot angels.

The term can also be applied

It can be applied to one order since

its task is to provide a capablllt, read, to act.42 The presence
01"

virtue alwa,s indicates that the power is tully determined and

consequent11 prepared to act.

It can be applied to a second

order since they have the power 01" working miracles.43

The, have

a power over and beyond nature.
It is legitimate to speak 01" three types ot virtual presence,
Elements are virtually present in a compound, the elements determine the properties and modes ot operation ot the compound. 44
Thus the torms of the elements determine the second acts ot the
compound although in

&

modified torm.

Conclusions are virtual11

present in the prinoiples tram Which tne1 are drawn, understanding of the principles begets drawing 01" the oonclusions. 4S In
the understanding ot the principles is the determination to a
second act (here in a logical, not an ontological sense), the
drawing 01" the conclusion.

411_1., I, 108,

S,

Finalll," principal cause is virtu-

ad 1.

4ZAccording to tne acneme ot pseudo-Dion1sius.
108, OomE. Theol., I, 126.
43According to tne scheme ot Gregory.
D8 Mtxt.
44-

ad

4.

!_!., II-II, 44. 2

c.

---

Elem., SI S.T., I, 16,

4Sne ~., ~, 11

CJ

4,

~.

--

S.T.,

I,
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alll present in tbe instrument. 46 Tn. instrument possesses a
capabilltJ over and above what 1s natural to it, this PQwer is
the virtual presence ot the principal. cause.
There are numerous miscellaneous meanings ot virtus:

lt

can indio ate the presence ot anettect in a cauae47 and be aynonomous with ettect,48 meanlng,49 o:r miracle. SO The explanation how
the.e usages a:re related to the detinition proposed as central is
at beat bJpothetloal .ince Saint Thoma. do._ not provide any
explicit anall_e. ot tbes. instanoes.

In tbe inatances ot an

.tteot in its cause and ot a cause in 1ta etteot, a

dete~1ned

relationship or disposition does exist between the two terms ot
tbe operation. the ettect, prior to ita being actual, is present
in it. cause in a state that exceeds pure potentialitl. and the

oau.e perdures in its ettect in a manner tbat i. real, yet no
longer identitiable with tbe aotual exercise ot it. etticient
oauaalit,.

Thus a disposition ot a tirst aot (oause) t9 its

second aot (etteot) is discoverable, but this relationship ot
tirst to seoond act is not in accord with the approp:riate usage

ot the two terma. virtue, bovever, mal be said to be vindioated

46l)e .!!!•• 27, It.

CJ

!.I ••

III. 62, 1, ad 2.

47~.! •• I, ~, 2 o.

4.8!!

IV

491ft

I Sent., 10, 1,

1, ad 1.--

!!!1l., lS, 4,

2, sol. 3.

4,

ad 1, S.T., It 29, 4.

SO!.!., II-II, 178, 1, ad l.

--

0, _Ibid.,

)6,

'11
in an analogous sense.

Meaning and virtue can be synonyms.

word possesses a power to convey meaning.

A

This power can be

called a virtus since the word as a subject possesses a capacitl
whereby it produces a second act, its meaning.

Again the terms

of the central detinition are verified in analogous senses.

Last

ot all, a miracle may be called a virtue because it is an occurrence which is over and belond nature.

Habits determine their

subject powers over and beyond the natural endowments ot the
powers.

Since miracles, like habits, are over and beyond nature,

they are virtues.
Finalll, virtus can mean the peak ot a thing's power.51
This usage is acceptable it understood materiall,$2; the maximum
or minimum indicates precisely what the virtue ot a thing is.
This usage, however, does not catch the essential meaning; virtue

18 a formal determination to operation whether or not the operation works to full capacit, or not.
SlIn I De Oae1. et Kund., 25, n. ~9J Ibid., nne 2$1-2. In

r. $2ne Vir. in Cam., 1,
---- - -

-

I !!!l.,~, ~ !;'Qd

ad 6.

-

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This tinal chapter will be composed of three parts.
the oentral definition, dis2ositio perfeoti

~

First,

optimum, will be

disoussed--what the definition means in its entirety and what
each individual term signities.

Secondly. an attempt will be

made to classify the several usages of virtus.

Here attention

will be given to the question whetb.er the subjeot term is predicated analogously, univacally. or equivocally in the writings ot
Aquinas.

Thirdly and tinally, the already posed question whether

the use at virtue to signify habit bas a primacy in the mind ot
Aquinas will be inVestigated.
The tirst oonolusion at this studJ is that dispositio eerteeti

~

oetimum 1s the essential definition ot virtue.

It has

been translated as "the tOPmal determination ot an operative
potency to its proper activity."l Diseositio is the formal
determination.

It is a first act relative to a second; virtue is

essentially a determination to another act.

Yet after careful

reflection upon the uses of virtus discussed in the previous
chapters, the inevitable conclusion is that dis20s1tio assumes

lot. above, p. 19.
72

~IJ

manifold meanings.
This
essence.

determination can be identified withtheidivine

~ormal

It cm1 also be identified with the nature of finite

beings in the instanceot natural potencies.

It can be a proper

acoident such as agent intellect, it can be a further determination of an acoident such as a habit.

It can be identified with

the disposition of potency for existence.
nation of an act
act

o~

o~

conoluding.

It can be the determi-

understanding premises leading to a further
It can likewise be the totalit7

o~

a personal

being's powers as it i8 in the case ot the angelic virtues.

The

central notion ot determination pervades all these instanoes of
virtus; not in all cases, however, is the dispositio a formal
determination.
Per~eotl

indicates the subject of the formal determination,

it is usually an operative potenc7.

Again usage provides a wider

range of meaningstol" the tex-m.

The subject of virtue can be the

all-perfeot. tbe divine essence.

It oan be a finite nature, it

can be an accidental pel"tection like the agent intellect, the
possible intellect, or the will.

The perfeotum

C&.ll

be a non-

operative poteno7. in the case ot the virtus ot pOtene7 to being.
It can also be a substance, as it ia in the case of the presence
of elements in a oompound or ot principal oause in an instrument.
Th.e pertectum can be an act ot understanding, it <lan be &nangel.
In all cases the notion ot subject is verified, most otten tne
subject is an operative potane1_
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Finally, virtus is !8 optimum.

Tbe optimum is the aotivity

proper to the subJeot; moat often it is a seoond aot.
can quite properly reter to the operation ot God.

Yet oetimum

Also it oan

indioate the aot ot existenoe or the act ot living, i.e., first
aot.

It sometimes signities a miraoulous aot.

course, it is a second aot.

Most often, of

an aot ot sensing, understanding,

willing, an angelic operation, the influence ot properties on the
operations of a oompound.

Oooasionally it is a single aspeot of

an operative aot, as in the case of principal and instrumental
oauses.

Finally, o:etimum may be a temporally seoond aot, as it

is when it signifies an aot of concluding subsequent upon a prior
aot ot understanding.

In all oases the notion of aotivit7 domi-

ates, usuallJ oRtlmum means seoond aot or operation.
Thus disposl tio :eerfeoti:,
nItion of virtus.

~

optimum Is tbe eS8ential defi-

In the fullnes8 of its meaning it signifies

nthe formal determination ot an operative potenoy tor its proper
aotiv1t7_"

In aotual usage, however, virtul otten means "the

determination ot a subjeot to aotivit,.."
A seoond task to be aocomplished in this ohapter is the
classification of the usages of virtu. by Saint Thomas.

A dis-

tinction oan be drawn between primar,. and seoondary usages.
justifioation tor this distinction is twotold.

The

First, the olassi-

tication ot the virtues in the oentral text is the most comprehensive set ot oategories oftered by Saint Thomas.

Secondly, as

11 be shown, the primar,- usages more olosely adhere to the

7$

meaning of the essential detinition ot virtus.

The primary usages

are those trom the classification given in the central text.

The

secondary uses are those which tall outside the above classification.
The primal"Y' usages are threetold.

There are the virtues of

Examples ot this type are the

the totally active potencies.

divine power, the agent intellect, and tne natural potencies.

A

second type are tne virtues of the purely passive potencies.
Example. are the sense taculties While they are actually being
determined by their objects to aot.
tuea ot habituated potenciea.

Finally, there are the vir-

The intellectual and moral virtues

are examples ot this twe.
There are numel'OUS secondary usages.
virtues ot potency to being.
tues in three senses t

First, thel'e are the

Secondly. angels can be oalled vir-

all angels when designated under this name

are regarded as intermediaries between essence and operation,
one order ot angels has oharge ot providing a faoulty tully read1
to act, another order works miraoles.
types ot virtual presenoe I

Thirdly, the" are a.veral

elements are virtually contained in

compounds, a conolusion is tound virtuall,. in its premises, the
principal cause is vinuall,. present in its instrument, an eftect
reaides vi:rtuall1 in its cause.
called a virtue.
power.

Fou:rtbly, a miracle oan be

Fitthly, virtue can be equated with peak of

Final!'1, virtue can be a sJllonrm tor meaning or e:ttect.
There are two other meanings which will not be classitied
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since their usage is rejected by Saint Thomas as improper.

Vir-

tue oan be synonomous with object or with aot.
In this context, it will be suitable to disouss whether
virtue is predicated univocally, equivooally, or analogously in
the works of Aquinas.
the

te~

It is the conclusion of this study that

1s predicated analogously.

In each instance there 1s

both similarity and dissimilaritY' in the manner in which the term
is used.
In the case of the primary usages. they have this in common
that in each case virtusr is a tormal disposition to operation.
T

They ditfer according to the relation between the determination
and its subject.

For the total11 active potenci.s, the formal

detel'nlination and the subject are identified permanently.

For

sense in act, both the tOl'Il1&l determination and the subject are
united. but only transientl,..

Finally, in the case 01' a habit.

the virtue is a pertection superadded to the poteney and residing
in it.

In each case the relationship between determination and

subject ditfers depending on whether they are united, either permanently or transiently. and whether the determination is an
abiding disposition 01' the subject or not.

In all oases, the

virtue is a tormal determination to operation whether this operative act has ita origin in God or in another being, living. sensitive, intellectual, or volitional.
Among the sGconda17 usages 01' vlrtua. the analogy takes two
torms.

In the tirst, the similarity consists in the fact that
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the virtue in

eve~

instance complies with part of the oentral

detinition, usually determination to activity.

Among these usa-

ge. the dissimilarity arises from the taot that either the subject of the virtue is not an operative potencf or the activit1 is
Ex.amples trom this categorf are the virtues ot

not second aot.

potencY' to being, angels (in the classification ot Saint Gregorl
the Great) ,all types ot virtual presence, and peak ot power.
Seoondly, the analogy is otten baaed on a similarity to either at
the most frequent usages of virtus, as power or habit, even

t~ough

there might be great dissimilarity in terms ot the esssntial
definition.

Instanoes ot this oategory are miracles, angels in

general or, acoording to pseudo-Diony.ius, meaning and effeot.
Each of the seoondaJ7 usages then is both similar and dissimilar to the oentral notion ot virtu..

Potenoy to being has a

disposition tor an aotivit1' but this aotivity is tirst act and
the subjeot is not an operative potenoy.

Angels oan bear three

possible similarities to the oentral notiont

the, can mediate

between essence and operation as a habit does, the'1 provide a
facultJ prepared tor operation, they oan possess the power at
working miracles, a power exceeding natural capabilit, (an habituated power exceeds the natural oapability).
angelic

vi~tues

In eaoh case toe

possess tnese dissimilarities to the central

notion ot virtue I

the determination represents the adequac)? ot

their powers to operate; and the subject 1s a nature and not just
his operational capabilities.

For the elements in a compound or

18
tor the principal oause in an instrument, the virtue is a formal
determination to the proper operation ot the elements or ot
prinoipal agent.

tr~

Yet in each ease, the determination no longer

pertects its natural subject but another, the compound or the
The virtual presence ot a conolusion in its premis ••

instrument.

oonsist. in the tact that in the aot ot understanding the prinoiples there is a determination to a seoond act, drawing the conolusion.

The sequenoe, however, is logioal and not ontological.

Likewise the ettect resides in its cause inasmuoh as the cause
bas the power to produce the eftect and qua cause is a subjeot
determined to the .tfect, the etfect, however, whioh 1s the
object of the determination, is not the seoond act of the cause.
A miracle bears a resemblance to a habit, it exoeeds the capacity
ot natUl"e.

The miraole, however, is not a tormal determination

to operation, but an etfect of the operation.

Virtue as a peak

of power indicates the maximum determination ot a potency, 7et
peak

ot power only desoribe. the determination, it doe. not

direot17 signify it.

Meaning and ettect bear a likeness to a

prinoipal usage ot virtu!_ power.

The

meaning or a word is its

power to evoke understanding, the duration ot an act acoording to
its etteet is indicative that the power continues even though the
act has ceased.

Neither usage is a determination ot a potency.

Finally. there i. the questLon whether virtue as a habit is
to be accorded a certain primacy in the writings ot Saint Thomas.
There are

~o

reasons that tavor such an interpretation.

First,
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all the texts concerning virtue in general are in the context ot
virtue as a habit.

Secondly. numerous secondary usages have

their derivation trom the central notion in their similarity to
virtue as a habit:

ot a potency.

they are something over and above the nature

And yet there are three objeotions to this primacy

tor habitual virtue.

Even though Saint Thomas always discussed

the general notion in oonneotion with this partioular type, ha'
never makes any explicit mention of such a primacy.

Seoondly,

there are additional derived usages which have their basis' in the
general notion ot virtus or in their similarity to virtue as
power.

Finally, there oan be no question ot a metaphysical pri-

macy to be accorded virtue as a habit because, 1n line with tne
rest of his metapoysical thought, Saint Thomas would find the
divine virtue as the prtmary analegate ot all other virtue ••
How then are the contexts ot the central texts to be explained? It an attempt is made to reflect upon the opportunities
available to Saint Thoma. to discuss virtus in general,
mo~e

suitable explanation ot the contexts will evolve.

pe~hap.

a

In dis-

cussions of the presenoe of elements in a compound, virtue was an
adequate solution to a vexing problem, Wb1 the
compound were somewhat similap to the
in a free state.

p~ope~ties

p1"ope~tles

of a

ot the elements

The investigation, however, concerned the rela-

tion ot a compound and its elements.

When the virtual presence

ot a principal cause in its instrument was being treated, the
principal tocus was on tne nature of dual causality.

Viptue was
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onl1 an apt term to describe the relationship ot the two causes.

In treatises on angels, virtue was merell a name to be applied to
all or to a particular order; the contexts were bardl,. suitable
fol' discussing

vlr'tu~

in general.

FinaU,.. whenever virtue is

used as s.,nol\J1'!lOus with th.e divine power, the age.nt intellect,
tbe natural potencies, etc., the subject tor discussion is not
vil'tus 'but the Nal! t7 so named.

In tbe cas. ot virtue as a habit, however, a difterent slt~ation

prevailed.

The term virtus vas being us.d as such.

Given

the opportunitl to discours8 on virtue as such, Saint Thomas then
proceeds to render an explanation ot what virtue in general is.
rt'bereason whJ all the dl.cuasions ot virtue in general appear in

th&oontext ot habl tual virtue 1s that virtue as a bab! t 1s the
onll suitable context tor disoussing tbe ,8neral notion.

Wherever

e18e Saint Thomas discus8ed virtue, tbe topio ot tbe di.cusslon

was not virtue as such, anl treatment ot tbe general notion would
there tore bave been misleading.
A comparison can be drawn between the articl•• which concern virtue in seneral and the initial articl. ot al Pgt!9t1a.2
The oi tedvol'k,

title.

R!

11k."~ Vll'tut~~us!!

Oommuni, has a deceptive

Potentia i . a treati.e not on p.otenol as suoh, but on

tbe divine power.

The prooedure amplored. bowever, 1s. similar to

that ot the texts on virtue.

Betore be treats the topic

tOI'

4i8-
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cussion, Saint Thomas examines the notion of Rotentia in general.
From the general he proceeds to the particular notion which is
the subject of the study.
tue.

So it 18 with the discusslons of vir-

Aquinas first investigates the general significance of th.e

term even tbough a particular meaning is proper11 the matter at
hand.

Two further arguments can be adduce d in support of t he contention tbat no primacy i. to be aceorded virtue as a babit.
First, virtue in this sense 1s not the most frequent usage ot
virtu8 b7 Saint Thomas.

Schutz in his '1'homas-Lex1kon catalogued

oyep a hundred ditterent types 01' uses of virtus

IS

the proximate

principle 01' aotivity against about tifty diftePent t1pes ot virtue in the .ense ot a babit.)
between Saint Thomas

f.

Seoondly, a parallel can be drawn

day and our own.

It a contemporarJ phi-

losopher wanted to discus. the general meaning ot the term,

-

tue, be would do

80

!it-

in tbe context ot virtue as opposed to vice,

sinoe this meaning is the one oommonly associated with the word.

As a consequence, the modern would also discuss virtue in general
in oonjunction with virtue as a babit even though Webster's Dictionary lists several other ourrent meanings ot the term.'
3Schutz, PP. 8S2-7 & 8,9-64.

4t'VIRTUE

• • • • 1. pl. One ot the orders ot angels. 2.
Moral practice or action, moral excellenoe, reotitudeJ morality.
3. A partioular moral $xcellenoe; any moral quality conceived as
a good, also, such virtues collectively • • • • 4. Active quality
or power, power adequate to tbe production ot a given etteot,
potency, efficacy. as, a medicine without virtue, also, a partio-
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As a result, it is the oonolusion ot this study that virtue as a habit has no pFimaoy among the usages by Aquinas ot ]itThe context ot the general disoussions is to be explained
-tus.
in terms ot a praotical exigenoy, virtue as a habit was the only
suitable occasion tor Saint Thomas to discuss virtue in general.
Virtus then in the writings ot Saint Thomas Aquinas is
essentially defined as di8P08itio perrecti
directly a tormal determination.
perfection ot a potency.

~ opti~.

It is

This formal determination is a

It is also essentially relative, it is

determination to some type ot activity.

There are pr1mary usages

ot virtus such as the divine power, the agent intelleot, the
natural potencies, and habits.

There are secondary usages 8uch

as the virtue of potency to being, angel, miracle, peak of power,
and virtual presence which are less preoisely conneoted with the
essential meaning.

When the tem is used, it is predicated

analogously.
ular instance of suoh virtue, as, the virtue or a given remedJ.
Hanll strength or courage, valor. 6. EXcellence or an excellenoe ot any kind, as, to make a virtue of nece.sity. 7. Obaatity, esp., the cnastity of women ••-In, or Bz virtue ot. Through
the toroe ot, by authority or." Webster's Iewbolt.sIite Dictionarl' 2nd ed. (Springfield: C. &; d. I'Eirrlam do., ~>4 r;-

S.

p.

4;3 •
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